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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This

Court,

having

granted

the

Petition

for

Writ

of

Certiorari, has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(5) (2002) .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the district court and the court of appeals

erred by determining that trespassers are members of the "public"
for purposes of satisfying the Dedication Statute.

On certiorari,

this Court does not review the decision of the trial court but
rather that of the court of appeals, which this Court reviews for
correction of error.

Harper

v. Summit

P. 3d 193 (citing State ex rel.
P.3d 80); see

also

Landes

v.

County,

2001 UT 10, KlO, 26

M.W. and S.W.,
Capital

1129 (Utah 1990) (citing Madsen

City

2000 UT 79, f8, 12

Bank,

v. Borthick,

795 P.2d 1127,

769 P.2d 245, 247

(Utah 1988)).
2.
erred

by

Whether the district court and the court of appeals
determining

that

the

Bennie

Creek

Road

had

been

continuously used as a public thoroughfare as required by the
Dedication Statute.

Rather than reviewing the decision of the

trial court, this Court, on certiorari, reviews the decision of
the court of appeals, which is reviewed for correction of error.

1

Harper

v. Summit

State ex rel.
Landes

County,

M.W. and S.W.,

v. Capital

(citing Madsen
3.

2001 UT 10, flO, 2 6 P. 3d 193

City

v.

(citing

2000 UT 79, 1(8, 12 P. 3d 80); see

Bank,

Borthick,

795 P.2d 1127, 1129

also

(Utah 1990)

769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)).

Whether the court of appeals erred by determining that

the Dedication Statute does not require a specific ten-year period
of continuous use.

On certiorari, this Court does not review the

decision of the trial court but rather that of the court of
appeals, which this Court reviews for correction of error.
v. Summit

County,

rel.

and

M.W.

v. Capital
Madsen

2001 UT 10, 1(10, 26 P. 3d 193 (citing State

S.W.,

City

2000 UT 79, 118, 12 P.3d 8 0 ) ; see

Bank,

v. Borthick,

4.

Harper

795 P.2d 1127, 1129

ex

also

Landes

(Utah 1990)

(citing

769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)).

Whether the court of appeals erred by determining that

the statutory damages in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 are automatic,
and that the district court has no discretion in awarding such
damages.

As previously

set

forth, instead of reviewing

the

decision of the trial court, this Court, on certiorari, reviews
the decision of the court of appeals, which is reviewed for
Harper

correction of error.
P.3d 193 (citing State
P.3d 80); see

also

v. Summit

ex rel.

Landes

v.

County,

2001 UT 10, flO, 26

M.W. and S.W.,
Capital

2

City

2000 UT 79, ^| 8, 12

Bank,

795 P.2d 1127,

1129 (Utah 1990) (citing Madsen

v.

Borthick,

769 P.2d 245, 247

(Utah 1988)).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
and regulations, whose interpretation is determinative in the
instant

appeal,

are

set

out

verbatim,

with

the

appropriate

citation, in the body and arguments of the instant Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This
requisite

case

involves

critical

legal

principles

and

questions

elements

for

concerning

the

dedication

and

abandonment of a private road to the public use and the statutory
damages for failing to remove an installation within the right-ofway of a highway.

The court of appeals misinterpreted

and

misapplied the law in the course of rendering its opinion.
Utah County and the State of Utah initiated this case by
suing Petitioners, as property owners, seeking a determination
that the route described as the Bennie Creek Road be deemed to
have been dedicated and abandoned to the public use pursuant to
statute.
for

a

Upon denying the request of Utah County and the State
temporary

allegations.

restraining

order,

Petitioners

Subsequent mediation efforts failed.

3

denied

the

The parties appeared before the district
course of several days for trial.

court over the

Following trial, the district

court issued a Memorandum Decision, concluding that the Bennie
Creek Road had been dedicated and abandoned to the public use.

In

its decision, the district court denied Utah County's request for
statutory damages based on the alleged failure to remove a gate.
Petitioners
appealed.

filed a timely appeal and Utah County cross

After oral argument, the court of appeals issued a

published opinion in which it affirmed in part and remanded in
part for a determination of statutory damages owed to Utah County.
See Utah County

v.

Butler,

2006 UT App 444, 147 P. 3d 963.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

This

Court granted the Petition.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Utah County and the State of Utah, in October of 2000,

sued Petitioners, as property owners, alleging illegal closure of
a public road and easement as well as unjust enrichment (RR. 1-12,
186-99).

In the Complaint, Utah County and the State sought a

judicial determination that the route described as the Bennie
Creek Road be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the

4

public

use

pursuant

to Utah

Code Ann.

§

72-5-1041 and

its

predecessor statute, Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89 (R. 6) .
2.
the

After the court denied the request of Utah County and

State

Petitioners

for

a

denied

temporary
the

restraining

allegations

order

(R. 268-77) .

(R.

118-20),

Subsequent

attempts to mediate the matter failed (See, e.g., RR. 1285-89,
1372) .
3.

Over

the

course

of

several

days

in

June

2004,

Petitioners appeared before the district court for trial (R. 144255) .
4.

Thereafter, the district

court

issued its decision,

concluding that the Bennie Creek Road had been dedicated and
abandoned to the public use (R. 1456-73)2.

In its decision, the

district court denied Utah County's request for statutory damages
based on the alleged failure to remove a gate (R. 1458-59).
5.

Petitioners filed a timely appeal (R. 1620-23).

Utah

County cross appealed (R. 1630-31).
6.

Following oral argument, the court of appeals issued a

published opinion in which it affirmed in part and remanded in
l

See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2001), a true and correct copy
of which is attached hereto as Addendum A.
2

A true and correct copy of the district court's Memorandum
Decision
(R. 1456-73) and its subsequent Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order (R. 1507-26) memorializing the decision
are attached hereto as Addendum B.
5

part for a determination of statutory damages owed to Utah County.
See

Utah County

v. Butler,

2006 UT App 444, 147 P.3d 963, a true

and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum C.
7.

Petitioners, through counsel, filed a Petition for Writ

of Certiorari.

This Court granted the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari as to the following issues:
1.
Whether trespassing may constitute a public use
pursuant to the Dedication Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 725-104.
2.
Whether
the
district
court
erred
in
its
determination that the public had continuously used the
road at issue in this case according to the requirements
of the Dedication Statute.
3.
Whether the district court failed to designate a
specific ten-year period of continuous use and, if so,
whether that failure constituted reversible error.
4.
Whether the court of appeals erred in its
application of Utah Code Ann. § 73-7-104(4) to the facts
of this case.
See Order, dated March 15, 2007, a true and correct copy of which
is attached hereto as Addendum D.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The district court and the court of appeals erred by

determining that trespassers are members of the
purposes of satisfying the Dedication Statute.

"public" for

According to the

record on appeal in the instant case, a substantial number of the
governments' witnesses utilized
6

at trial were trespassers on

Petitioners' property.

By refusing to apply common law trespass

to the elements of dedication set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 72-5104, the district court and the court of appeals misinterpreted
the requisite elements underlying the Dedication Statute. Because
the use by trespassers is based upon wrongful conduct and a lack
of

good

faith, equitable principles

and

sound public

policy

dictate that they are not members of the public for purposes of
the Dedication Statute.
2.

The district court and the court of appeals erred by

determining that the Bennie Creek Road had been continuously used
as a public thoroughfare as required by the Dedication Statute.
Use

of

the

Bennie

Creek

Road^was

interrupted^-by

p. J

naturally

[?)'

occurring conditions, locked gau^s^cn the road, trespassing signs,
a bog resulting from spring water and ditches, and the flow of
irrigation water on the road.
The district court misinterpreted the Dedication Statute and
misapplied

the

underlying

legal

pertaining

to the elements of

principles

of

the

statute

"continuous use" as a "public

thoroughfare" when it determined that the Bennie Creek Road was in
continuous use by the public as a public thoroughfare.

Moreover,

the court of appeals erred by basing its conclusion upon that of
the

district

court,

which

failed

7

to

consider

that

the

aforementioned circumstances precluded the public from accessing
the road as often as they found it convenient or necessary.
3.

Both the trial court and the court of appeals erred by

determining
specific

that

the

Dedication

Statute

does

ten-year period of continuous use.

not

require

a

By refusing to

specifically identify the ten-year period, the district court both
misinterpreted and misapplied the Dedication Statute.

The court

of appeals, in turn, refused to enforce the speciEic ten-year
period of time.

By so doing, the court of appeals affirmed the

district court's impermissible shifting of the burden of proof to
Petitioners, as landowners.
employed

This failure further ignored the

presumption

to be

in

favor

of

the

Petitioners, as

landowners.

The trial court's refusal to pinpoint the requisite

ten-year period of time of continuous use was an impermissible
effort to shift the burden of such a determination to the court of
appeals, as a depository in which the burden and determination is
then to be performed.
4.

The court of appeals erred by determining

that the

statutory damages provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 are
automatic, and that

the district

awarding such damages.

court has no discretion in

A position that statutory damages are

automatic with no discretion to be exercised by the district court
is contrary to the plain language of the statute, where the
8

Legislature utilized the permissive term "may" throughout various
subsections of the statute.
Adopting the court of appeals' interpretation of the statute
requires the insertion of the mandatory term "shall" into the
statute, which is contrary to the legislative
statute.

intent of the

By employing the permissive term "may" in contrast to

the compulsory term "shall", the Legislature specifically intended
and thereby enabled the court to exercise discretion in awarding
the statutory damages provided for in the statute.
The district court exercised its discretion in the instant
case by considering various factors surrounding the metal gate.
An interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 that enables the
district court to exercise discretion in awarding damages is
consistent with this being a case in equity.

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
BY DETERMINING THAT TRESPASSERS ARE MEMBERS OF THE
"PUBLIC" FOR PURPOSES OF SATISFYING THE DEDICATION
STATUTE.
A,

The Dedication
Principles•

Statute

and

Related

Legal

According to the Dedication Statute, which is set forth at
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104

(2001) , "A highway is dedicated and

abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously

9

used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years."
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001).

See

Because private property is

constitutionally protected,3 "[t]he law does not lightly allow the
transfer of property from private to public use."
Estate of Bernardo,

Draper

City

v.

888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995).

Consistent with the constitutional protection that private
property

enjoys,

the

circumstances

such

dedication

clear

Thomson
Petersen
(1968)).

by

v. Condas,
v.

as

government's
the

and

instant

convincing

taking
case

of

property

''requires

evidence."4

Id.

proof

in
of

(citing

27 Utah 2d 129, 130, 493 P.2d 639, 639 (1972);

Combe,

20 Utah 2d 376, 377-78, 438 P.2d 545, 548

"This higher standard of proof is demanded since the

ownership of property should be granted a high degree of sanctity
and respect."

Id.

(citing Petersen, 438 P. 2d at 548-4 9 (Crockett,

C.J., dissenting)).
Additionally, "'[t]he presumption is in favor of the property
owner; and the burden of establishing public use for the required
3

According to the Utah Constitution, "Private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." See
Utah Const, art. I, § 2 2 .
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides, "nor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation."
See U.S. Const,
amend. V.
4

The clear and convincing evidence standard requires "clear,
explicit, and unequivocal evidence" that is "sufficiently strong to
command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind." See 9A
Am.Jur. PI. & Pr. Forms Evidence
§ 140 (2005).
10

period of time is on those claiming it.'"
v. Pine
Bonner

Meadow Ranches,
v. Sudbury,

Leo M. Bertagnole,

639 P.2d 211, 213

Inc.

(Utah 1981) (quoting

18 Utah 2d 140, 143, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (1966)).

Under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, "xthe highway, even though it be
over privately owned ground, will be deemed dedicated or abandoned
to the public use when the public has continuously used it as a
thoroughfare for a period of 10 years, jbut such
public.'"
723

Thompson

v. Nelson,

(1954) (quoting Morris

use must be by

the

2 Utah 2d 340, 345, 273 P.2d 720,
v.

Blunt,

49 Utah 243, 251, 161 P.

1127, 1131 (1916) (emphasis added)).
Finally,

dedication

equity.

Richards

v.

Pines

1977) .

Consequently,

and

abandonment

Ranch,

this

Inc.,

Court

cases

are

cases

559 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah

is not

bound

to

recognize

findings or determinations that are contrary to the evidence.
B.

in

Jd.

Sound Public Policy Dictates that Trespassers
Are Not Members of the Public for Purposes of
Dedication
and
Abandonment
of
Private
Property for the Public Use.

According to the record on appeal in the instant case, a
substantial number of the governments' witnesses utilized at trial
were

trespassers

on

Petitioners'

property

(see,

e.g.,

R.

1639:39:7-12; R. 1639:55:9-12; R. 1639:71-72; R. 1640:232-33; R.
1640:287:3-7; R. 1640:347:4-21; R. 1640:378:16-21; R. 1641:509:917; R. 1642:709:16).

The Petitioners, as landowners, among other

11

ttftf* \ (^ things, diligently posted "no trespassing" signs (see, e.g.,
T
U

^Q 1

placed gates across the road

id.),

(see, e.g., R. 1642:710:18), and

called the county sheriff to have trespassers removed (see, e.g.,
R. 1645:1073:11-17).
Pursuant to common law trespass, "[t]he essential element of
trespass

is physical

possessory action.'"

invasion of the land;
Walker

Drug Co.,

Inc.

v. La Sal

P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1998) (quoting John
Utah State

Conf.,

Bricklayers

Locals

Nos.

'[t]respass

Price

Oil

Assocs.,

is a

Co.,
Inc.

972
v.

1, 2 & 6, 615 P.2d 1210,

1214 (Utah 1980) and citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158
(1977)); see

also

Wood v. Myrup,

681 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 1984).

Trespass is a "wrongful entry . . . upon the lands of another."
See O'Neill

v.

San Pedro,

L.A.

& S.L.R.

Co.,

38 Utah 475, 479, 114

P. 127, 128 (1911).
The totality of the aforementioned circumstances demonstrates
that most of the witnesses utilized by Utah County and the State
were trespassers. As such, those witnesses should not and did not
constitute members of the public for purposes of establishing
dedication and abandonment of the Bennie Creek Road for the public
use pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104.

By refusing to apply

common law trespass to the elements of dedication set forth in
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, the district court and the court of
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appeals

misinterpreted

the requisite

elements

underlying

the

appeals

concluded

the

Dedication Statute.
In

its

opinion,

court

of

that

Petitioners'
proposed
interpretation
would
render
the
Dedication Statute ineffective because no use
could ever constitute public use.
To give the
Dedication Statute proper effect, we hold that
nonpermissive use must be considered public use.
We therefore agree with the trial court that
trespassers are members of the "public" for
purposes of determining whether the Dedication
Statute has been satisfied.
Utah

County

v. Butler,

(citation omitted).

2006 UT App

444, Kll, 147 P. 3d 963

The reasoning of the court of appeals is

seriously flawed inasmuch as it equates nonpermissive use as one
and same with trespassing.

Cf.

Chapman v. Uintah

County,

2003 UT

App 383, f2, 81 P.3d 761 (noting testimony of public use of road
year-around,

without

restrictions).
the

public

and

without

is

used

established
by

members

when
of

a

the

highway
public

thoroughfare for the requisite period of time.
faith

encountering

Dedication and abandonment of private property to

use

continuously

permission

use of the highway by the public.

or
as

road
a

is

public

This implies good

Trespassers are not good

faith users, rather they come to the court with unclean hands
based upon their wrongful conduct of invading another's property.
See Draper

City

v. Estate of Bernardo,
13

888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah

1995) (distinguishing between members of the general public and
those considered to be trespassers); accord

Vaughn

345 So.2d 1195, 1199 (La. Ct. App.), cert, denied,

v.

Williams,

350 So.2d

896

(La. 1977) (holding that public authority is precluded from taking
road unless landowner knowingly acquiesced

in public use and

maintenance, amounting to tacit dedication by landowner).
The court of appeals' decision, if allowed to stand, would
reward

the

lawless

and wrongful

conduct

of

trespassing

upon

another's property and, in turn, penalize a landowners diligent
efforts to protect his or her property within the parameters of
the law.

Such a result is contrary to the equitable principles

underlying the instant case.

See Park v.

Jameson,

12 Utah 2d 141,

364 P.2d 1, 3 (1961) (recognizing that a plaintiff must come to
equity with clean hands).
equitable

remedy

must

"In other words, a party who seeks an

have

acted

violation of equitable principles."

in good
Hone

v.

faith

and

not

in

Hone,

2004 UT App

241, %1, 95 P.3d 1221.

Because the use by trespassers is based

upon

and

wrongful

conduct

a

lack

of

good

faith,

equitable

principles and public policy dictate that they are not members of
the public for purposes of the Dedication Statute.
C.

By Refusing to Apply Trespass Principles, the
District Court and the Court of Appeals
Impermissibly Relieved Utah County and the
State of Their Burden and Ignored the

14

Presumption to be
Property Owners.
The

well-established

legal

Employed

in

principles

Favor

of

underlying

the

dedication and abandonment statute dictate that Utah County and
the State had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that those traveling the Bennie Creek Road were not trespassers.
Draper

City

v. Estate

1995); Campbell

v.

App.

By

1998).

of

Bernardo,

Box Elder
refusing

County,
to

888 P. 2d 1097, 1099

(Utah

962 P. 2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct.

apply

common

law

trespassing

principles to the requisite elements of dedication, the district
court and the court of appeals impermissibly relieved Utah County
and the State of their burden to prove dedication by clear and
convincing evidence; thereby shifting the burden to Petitioners,
as landowners, to prove otherwise.

Further, the refusal by the

district court and the court of appeals to apply the law of
trespass ignored the well-established presumption to be employed
in favor of property owners, which is to be applied due to the
high-degree of sanctity and respect of property ownership.
Draper

City,

888 P.2d at 1099; Campbell,

15

962 P.2d at 808.

Cf.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
BY DETERMINING THAT THE BENNIE CREEK ROAD HAD BEEN
CONTINUOUSLY USED AS A PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE AS
REQUIRED BY THE DEDICATION STATUTE.

Before a private road can be taken and dedicated for public
use pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, three elements must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence:

"'there must be (i)

continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period
Campbell

of ten years.'"

v. Box Elder

(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Heber
P.2d 307, 310
properly

(Utah 1997)).

established

if

uninterrupted use . . .
necessary."
(1958).
provided
chose
v.

Boyer

City

962 P.2d 806, 808

Corp.

v.

Simpson,

occurred

to pass.

public

"made

a

continuous

Inc.,

and

as often as they found it convenient or
Clark,

7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P. 2d 107, 109

as

often

as

the

claimant

had

559 P.2d 948, 949

omitted and emphasis added).

. . . .

occasion

Mere intermission is not interruption."

Ranch,

942

The "continuous use" element is

"[U]se may be continuous though not constant
it

Pines

v.

the

County,

(Utah 1977)

or

Richards
(citation

In sum, "under the continuous use

requirement, members of the public must have been able to use the
road whenever they found it necessary or convenient."

Campbell,

962 P.2d at 809.
In the instant case, the district court acknowledged that use
of the Bennie Creek Road was interrupted "by naturally occurring

16

conditions such as groundwater

(spring water) in wet years and

snow in the winter." (R. 1470).

The district court also conceded

that witnesses at trial testified "that there were locked gates on
the road."

(R. 1469).

In fact, the district

court

acknowledged that "[t]here was testimony regarding four

readily
gates

on

the Benny [sic] Creek road between U.S. Highway 89 and the Uintah
National Forest." (R. 1465) (Emphasis added).

The district court

further stated, "Virgil Neeves testified that between 1958 and
1980 there was a locked gate near the Gardner home (the last home
traveling west toward the forest service property, now occupied by
[Petitioner] Randy Butler) which was locked most of the time." (R.
1467-68).5
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court specifically
noted that Mr. Mike Condley, who had lived in the area from 1970
until

1979, "firmly recalled a locked gate near the Gardner

(Butler) home."

(R. 1468).

Shortly thereafter, by way of its

Decision, the district court also acknowledged that "Defendant
Blaine Evans and others put the locked gates farther west, near

5

The district court also noted that Mr. Neeves "saw people stuck
on the road and recalls a cable across the road to stop cars."
Without explanation, the district court refused to consider this
testimonial evidence, deeming it as "simply confused and inconsistent
with all of the other testimony about obstructions on the road in
question." (R. 1468) .
17

the present

cattle guard between the Butler home and

forest

service property." (R. 1467).
The district court, in addition to the gates, conceded that
<^7 \

there "was substantial testimony about ["no trespassing"] signs
along the road" and other locations
private

property."

(R.

1466;

see

"designating the area as
also

R.

1639:39:7-12;

R.

1639:55:9-12; R. 1639:71-72; R. 1640:232-33; R. 1640:287:3-7; R.
1640:347:4-21;
1642:709:16).

R.

1640:378:16-21;

R.

1641:509:9-17;

R.

Moreover, Petitioners, as landowners, called the

county sheriff to have various individuals removed from their
f)

property, as trespassers (see,

e.g., R. 1645:1073:11-17; see

also

R. 1466).
Travel by way of the Bennie Creek Road to the Forest Service
land was not only interrupted but precluded by what was commonly
referred to as a bog in the road, which was the result of springs
or ditches

(R. 1462) .

According to the record, this bog made

travel on the Bennie Creek Road difficult, if not impossible,
during ''certain seasons or certain times between 1925 and 1980"
(R. 1462).
Additionally,
established

that

unrebutted
the

road

testimony

provided

"is periodically

used

at
to

trial
deliver

irrigation water to property along the road and that when that

18

occurs, the road becomes impassable." (R. 1466). 6

The testimony

established that the road was used from 1950 through 1993 as the
irrigation
pastures

ditch to transport

on

both

1644:970:6-9).

sides

of

water

the

road

to the property owners'
(R.

1644:944:17-25; R.

According to the testimony at trial, "about every

three weeks" the road would be utilized for irrigation purposes
"[f]or approximately six days" at a time (R. 1644:974:11-20).
With total disregard for the foregoing, the district court
found that "neither the Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach)
families used that method or irrigation covering a period from
1925

to

1981."

(R.

1466;

R.

1518,

1fl8).

Ordinarily,

to

successfully challenge a finding, the appellant "must marshal the
evidence in support of the finding[] and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, the trial court's finding[] [is] so lacking
in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,'
thus making [it] 'clearly erroneous.'"

Valcarce

v.

961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted).

Fitzgerald,
There is no

evidence to marshal in support of the district court's finding.
As

a

result,

in

light

of

the

aforementioned

testimony

and

citations to the record, the trial court's finding is clearly
erroneous.
6

The irrigation practices of the landowners were performed
pursuant to "diligence rights" established in 1850 (R. 1645:1093:14) .
19

The district court misinterpreted the Dedication Statute and
misapplied

the

underlying

legal

pertaining

to the elements of

principles

of

the

statute

"continuous use" as a

"public

thoroughfare" when it determined that the Bennie Creek Road was in
continuous use by the public as a public thoroughfare.

Moreover,

the court of appeals erred by basing its conclusion upon that of
the

district

court,

which

failed

to

consider

that

the

aforementioned circumstances precluded the public from accessing
the road "as often as they found it convenient or necessary."
AWINC Corp.

v.

Simonsen,

See

2005 UT App 168, 111, 112 P.3d 1228.

III. BOTH THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT THE DEDICATION STATUTE
DOES NOT REQUIRE A SPECIFIC TEN-YEAR PERIOD OF
CONTINUOUS USE.
The Dedication Statute requires continuous use by the public
for

ten

years

before

private

abandoned to the public use.
(2001); Campbell
App. 1998).

v. Box Elder

property

can

be

dedicated

or

See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1)
County,

962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct.

The district court failed to specifically identify

such a ten-year period of time, which determination the court of
appeals affirmed.
The district court in the instant case concluded that "the
evidence is clear and convincing that for at least 10 years prior
to 1958 the road was open and traveled by the public as often as
20

necessary or convenient . . . ." (R. 1470).

In the course of its

decision, the district court stated that
even if it is concluded (which this Court
does not) that the road was gated and locked
in the late 50's and early 60's as described
by the Butlers, the road was used as
necessary and convenient by the public for
more than 10 years before that time and,
again, 10 years after that time.
(R. 1461; see also
In Draper

R. 1515, 1(28) .

City

v. Estate

of

Bernardo,

888 P. 2d 1097 (Utah

1995), Draper City and several individuals, as plaintiffs, brought
an action

seeking

declaration

that

a private

road

had

been

dedicated and abandoned to public use on the ground that it had
been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of
ten years.

Id.

at 1098. The trial court granted summary judgment

in favor of the plaintiffs, which the defendants appealed.

Id.

On appeal, this Court stated that "neither [plaintiffs], the
trial court in its findings, nor we have been able to pinpoint any
ten-year period during which public use, as we have defined it, of
the full length of the road is undisputed.

Continuous use for ten

years is required by section 27-12-89 [the predecessor statute to
Utah Code Ann. 72-5-104]."

Id.

at 1100.

Consequently, this Court

reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with its opinion.

Id.

at 1101.

21

Likewise,

the

district

court

in

this

case

failed

to

specifically pinpoint the requisite ten-year period of time, which
the court of appeals affirmed.
identify

the

ten-year

By refusing

period,

the

to

specifically

district

court

misinterpreted and misapplied the Dedication Statute.

both

The court

of appeals, in turn, refused to enforce a specific ten-year period
of time.
court's

In so doing, the court of appeals affirmed the district
impermissible

shifting

Petitioners, as landowners.
Meadow Ranches,
Sudbury,

of

Cf.

the

burden

of

Leo M. Bertagnole,

proof

Inc.

v.

639 P.2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981) (quoting Bonner

18 Utah 2d 140, 143, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (1966)).

to
Pine
v.
This

failure also ignored the presumption to be employed in favor of
the Petitioners, as landowners.

Id.

The trial court's refusal to

pinpoint the requisite ten-year period of time of continuous use
was

an

impermissible

effort

to

shift

the

burden

of

such a

determination to the court of appeals, as a depository in which
the burden and deteermination is then to be performed.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT THE
STATUTORY DAMAGES PROVIDED FOR IN UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 72-7-104 ARE AUTOMATIC, AND THAT THE DISTRICT
COURT HAS NO DISCRETION IN AWARDING SUCH DAMAGES.

In its cross-appeal to the court of appeals, Utah County
challenged the district court's ruling that it was not entitled to
statutory damages for the time period during which a metal gate
22

remained across the road after notice.

The court of appeals

misinterpreted and misapplied Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 in the
course of reversing the district court.
Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(1) provides:
If any person, firm, or corporation installs,
places, constructs, alters, repairs, or maintains
any approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline,
conduit, sewer, ditch culvert, outdoor advertising
sign, or any other structure or object of any kind
or character within the right-of-way of any
highway without complying with this title, the
highway authority having jurisdiction over the
right-of-way may:
(a) remove the installation from the rightof way or require the person, firm, or
corporation to remove the installation; or
(b) give written notice to the person,
firm,
or
corporation
to
remove
the
installation from the right-of-way.
See Utah

Code Ann.

§ 72-7-104(1)

Subsection (4) further provides that
recover:

(2001)
u

(emphasis

added).7

[a] highway authority may

(1) the costs and expenses incurred in removing the

installation, serving notice, and the costs of a lawsuit if any;
and

(b) $10 for each day the installation remained within the

right-of-way after notice was complete."

See Utah Code Ann. § 72-

7-104(4) (2001) (emphasis added).
The appellate court's "primary goal in interpreting statutes
is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the

7

A true and correct copy of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 (2001) is
attached hereto as Addendum E.
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plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to
achieve."
1171

Foutz

(internal

v.

City

of S.

quotation

Jordan,

marks

2004 UT 75, Ull, 100 P.3d

omitted).

In the

course of

interpreting a statute, the appellate court "presume[s] that the
legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning."

C.T.

v.

Johnson,

1999 UT 35, 1(9, 977 P.2d 479 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, the appellate court "read[s] the plain language of
the statute as a whole, and interpret [s] its provisions in harmony
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters."
Miller

v.

Weaver,

2003 UT 12, ^17, 66 P.3d 592.

Only when a

statute is ambiguous do we look to other interpretive tools such
as legislative history.

See Adams v.

Swensen,

2005 UT 8, ^8, 108

P.3d 725.
In the course of reversing the district court, the court of
appeals held that the district court "did not have discretion to
deny statutory damages" pursuant to the statute.
Butler,
contrary

2006 UT App 444, f21, 147 P.3d 963.
to

the

plain

language

of

the

Utah County

v.

Such a position is
statute,

where

the

Legislature utilized the permissive term "may" throughout various

24

subsections of the statute.8

See

Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(1),

(4) , and (5) (b) .
Adopting the court of appeals' interpretation of the statute
requires the insertion of the mandatory term "shall" into the
statute, which
statute.

is contrary to the legislative

intent of the

By employing the permissive term "may" in contrast to

the compulsory term "shall", the Legislature specifically intended
and thereby enabled the court to exercise discretion in awarding
the statutory damages provided
interpretation

does

inoperative, rather

not

render

it provides

for in the statute.
the

statute

the district

Such an

superfluous

or

court with the

discretion to more fully consider the totality of circumstances
surrounding the structure.
The district court exercised its discretion in the instant
case by considering various factors surrounding the metal gate.
For example, in its decision, the district court noted that for
some time since construction of the gate the road had been and had
not been obstructed, and that " [n] o evidence was presented to
clarify how many of the intervening 2,561 days were days when the
road

was

obstructed

and

how

many

were

not."

(R.

1459).

Consequently, the district court determined that Utah County, as
8

See State v. Wallace,
2006 UT 86, flO, 150 P.3d 540 (discussing
the permissive term "may" in contrast to the compulsory term "shall"
in the course of statutory interpretation).
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the moving party, failed to meet its "burden of providing specific
evidence

of the number of days

the Defendants

have been in

violation." (R. 1458).
The district court also exercised its discretion by taking
into consideration the fact that Utah County, itself, placed a
sign on the gate, which reads, "KEEP

GATE

CLOSED

- PRIVATE

PROPERTY TO FOREST SERVICE BOUNDARY - NO TRESPASSING OFF ROAD."
(R. 1648:
Sign) 9
very

Defendants' Exhibit 80C. -- Photo of Utah County's

Utah County's placement of the sign demonstrates, at the
least, acquiescence

in installation of

the gate not to

mention its closure across the road.
An interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 that enables
the district court to exercise discretion in awarding damages is
consistent with this being a case in equity.
Pines

Ranch,

Inc.,

See

Richards

v.

559 P. 2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977) . " [E] quity cases

afford courts discretion and latitude in fashioning equitable
remedies."

Hughes

v.

Cafferty,

2004 UT 22, ^[24, 89 P. 3d 148.

"A

court acting in equity is not required to recite its decision in
terms

of

specific

factors

or

to adhere

to

formulaic

tests.

Rather, its obligation is to effectuate a result that serves

9

Utah County stipulated that it had placed the sign on the closed
gate (R. 1645:1139-40).
A true and correct copy of Defendants'
Exhibit 80C is attached hereto as Addendum F.
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equity given the overall facts and circumstances of the individual
case."

Jd.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Petitioners respectfully ask that
this Court reverse both the court of appeals' determination that
the Bennie Creek Road was abandoned and dedicated to the public
use and the conclusion that Utah County was automatically entitled
to statutory damages under Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104.

Petitioners

further request that the Court, in the course of its reversal,
issue

a clear

principles

and

and

concise

elements

statement

of

for dedication

the
and

requisite

legal

abandonment

of a

private road to the public use as well as principles governing
§ 72-7-104 damages for failing to remove an installation within
the right-of-way of a highway.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of May, 2007.
ARNOXJD W WIGGINS , P . C .

Scott LJWig^rlns
*kb&o&¥tgys r©*JPetitioners
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ADDENDA
Addendum A:
Addendum B:
Addendum C:
Addendum D:
Addendum E:
Addendum F:

Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2001)
Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order
Utah County v. Butler,
2006 UT App 444,
147 P.3d 963
Order dated March 15, 2 007, granting
Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 (2001)
Defendant's Exhibit 80C -- Photo of Utah
County's Sign
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Tab A

RIGHTS-OF-WAY

72-5-104

(b) If the highway is a county road, city street under joint title as
provided in Subsection 72-3-104(3), or right-of-way described in Title 72,
Chapter 5, Part 3, Rights-of-way Across Federal Lands Act, title to all
interests in real property less than fee simple held under this section is
held jointly by the state and the county, city, or town holding the interest.
(3) A transfer of land bounded by a highway on a right-of-way for which the
public has only an easement passes the title of the person whose estate is
transferred to the middle of the highway.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 101; 1991, ch.
137, § 29; C. 1953, 27-12-101; renumbered
by L. 1998, ch. 270, § 131; 2000, ch. 324, § 6;
2001, ch. 79, § 2.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as §
27-12-101, and added new Subsection (1), making related changes in subsection designation.

The 2000 amendment, effective March 16,
2000, added Subsection (2Kb), making a related
change.
The 2001 amendment, effective March 9,
2001, added Subsections (2)(a)(ii) and (2)(a)(iii)
and the (2)(aXi) designation and substituted
"transportation purposes" for "highway purposes" in Subsections (1) and (2)(a)(i).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Rights of public and abutting owners.
Vacation of road.
Cited
Rights of public and abutting owners.
Erection of electric power lines on public
highway right-of-way, the fee to which is not in
the public but in the owner of the abutting
property, is within the purview of the easement
for highway purposes and is not an additional
servitude for which the abutting owner is entitled to compensation. Pickett v. California
Pac. Utils., 619 P.2d 325 (Utah 1980).
Statutes regulating water mains in relation
to highways clearly indicated that legislature
did not regard dedication of a street in a platted
subdivision as the surrender of an easement
with retention of the fee in the abutting owner.
White v. Salt Lake City, 121 Utah 134, 239 P.2d
210(1952).
Vacation of road.
When city vacated street property which was

never used by the public and never platted as a
street on the official records, the parties owning
the land abutting on either side of such property were entitled to fee simple interests to the
center line of the "street," because the grantor
who deeded the street property to the city was
also the grantor of the abutting landowners,
and no intention to the contrary appeared in
any of the original deeds. Fenton v. Cedar
Lumber & Hdwe. Co., 17 Utah 2d 99, 404 R2d
966 (1965).
Property developers' dedication of land for
public rights-of-way in a plat of a subdivision
gave a defeasible fee interest to the county in
the land dedicated for the road and, once the
county vacated the road, the abutting property
owner succeeded to the fee simple title of that
land. Falula Farms, Inc. v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d
569 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Cited in Nelson v. Provo City, 2000 UT App
205, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 20.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. J u r 2d Highways,
Streets, and Bridges § 183.

72-5-104.

C.J.S. — 39A C.J.S. Highways § 136.

Public use constituting dedication — Scope.

(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it
has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often years.
(2) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-way held by the
state in accordance with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103.
599

72-5-104

TRANSPORTATION CODE

(3) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and necessary
to ensure safe travel according to the facts and circumstances
History: L. 1963, c h . 39, * 89; C. 1953,
27-12-89; renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 270,
* 132; 2000, ch. 324, k 7.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as §
27-12-89

The 2000 amendment, effective March 16
2000, substituted "is" for "shall be deemed
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2med to
have been" m Subsection (1) and added SubsecSubs J ?
tions (2) and (3)
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Acceptance.
When owner of land deeded it to city for
public use but city never accepted it, no dedication took place and claim of purchaser from city
was invalid as against subsequent purchaser
from original owner of land William J Lemp
Brewing Co v P J Moran, I n c , 51 Utah 178,
169 P 459 (1917)
Burden of proof.
Where claim is made that a highway has
been dedicated to public use, there is a presumption in favor of the property owner and
the burden of establishing public use for the
required period of time is on those claiming it
Leo M Bertagnole, Inc v Pine Meadow
Ranches, 639 P2d 211 (Utah 1981)
Change in highway.
A public highway over public lands is estab
hshed, although there has been no official acceptance, when it has been used for longer than
ten years, if travel has remained substantially
unchanged, and practical identity of road preserved, that is sufficient, although there may
have been slight deviations from the common
way Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co v
Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P 646 (1929)

Slight change m course of highway or of its
location that does not materially change or
affect the general course thereof or affect its
location, nor break or change the continuity of
travel or use, does not constitute abandonment
or affect public nature of highway Sullivan v
Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P 954 (1930)
Control by landowners.
No dedication was shown under identically
worded predecessoi section where it appeared
that an alleyway which had more or less been
used by the public at will for a number of years
had from time to time been closed by the
abutting ow ners, who had at all times exercised
control over it Culmer v Salt Lake City, 27
Utah 252, 75 P 620(1904)
Estoppel.
Municipality may be estopped from asserting
dedication by acts and conduct that have been
relied on by others to their prejudice and,
likewise, private individual may be estopped in
the same way where he stands by and permits
others to improve land claimed to have been
dedicated Premium Oil Co v Cedar City, 112
Utah 324, 187 P2d 199 (1947)
Evidence.
Evidence showing, among other things, that
roadway was used continuously for recreational
and agricultural purposes and for access to
other business activities supported the trial
courts ruling that the roadway was dedicated
or abandoned to the public Kohler v Martin,
916 P2d 910 (Utah Ct App 1996)
Generally.
Where all three elements under this section
for the establishment of a public highway were
satisfied, the court had no discretion to ignore
that fact and erred in concluding that a road
was not a public highway Heber City Corp v.
Simpson, 942 P2d 307 (Utah 1997)
Intent of landowner.
—Necessary.
_•«
In order for a private road to become a puwjj
thoroughfaie there must be evidence o( intOT
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by the owner to dedicate the road to a public
use and an acceptance by the public. Such
intent may be inferred from declarations, acts
or circumstances and use by the general public.
Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d 426
(1964) (but see cases noted under "—Not necessary" below).
For cases discussing landowner's intent to
dedicate road to public use, see Wilson v. Hull,
7 Utah 90, 24 P. 799 (1890); Whittaker v.
Ferguson, 16 Utah 240, 51 P. 980 (1898);
Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 P. 955
(1901); Culmer v. Salt Lake City, 27 Utah 252,
75 P. 620 (1904); Brown v. Oregon Short Line
R.R., 36 Utah 257, 102 P. 740 (1909); Morris v.
Blunt, 49 Utah 243,161 P. 1127 (1916); William
J. Lemp Brewing Co. v. P.J. Moran, Inc., 51
Utah 178, 169 P. 459 (1917); Barboglio v.
Gibson, 61 Utah 314, 213 P. 385 (1923).
—Not necessary.
The determination that a roadway has been
continuously used by members of the general
public for at least ten years is the sole requirement for it to become a public road; it is not
necessary to prove the owner's intent to offer
the road to the public. Thurman v. Byram, 626
R2d 447 (Utah 1981).
l b establish a dedication of a road to a public
use, it is not necessary to prove landowner's
intent to dedicate the road to a public use. Leo
M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches,
639 P2d 211 (Utah 1981).
Private rights.
Creation of a private right in a public thoroughfare cannot occur; a prescriptive right is in
conflict with the dedication of land to the use of
the general public. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d
910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
"Public* defined.
Owners of property abutting or straddling
rural road and their personal visitors were not
members of public generally within this provision; burden of proving real public use of that
road continuously for ten years was not met in
suit by subdividers who sought to establish
that the road had become a public thoroughfare. Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438
P.2d 545 (1968).
Rights granted to public.
City still owned fee to strip, acquired under
Ibwnsite Act (43 U.S.C § 718 et seq , now
repealed), after alleged dedication thereof as
public street, so that only right that public
could have acquired would be right to easement
across strip for traveling purposes, and only
additional right contiguous property owners
n^ght acquire would be right of ingress to and
egress from their property. Premium Oil Co. v.
Cedar City, 112 Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947).
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Rights of subsequent grantees.
Where land is dedicated by owner as highway
and is accepted by public as such, all subsequent grantees of abutting lands are bound by
dedication. Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64
P. 955(1901).
Sufficiency of proof of dedication.
Highway over privately owned ground will be
deemed dedicated or abandoned to the public
use when the public has continuously used it as
a thoroughfare for a period of ten years. Morris
v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916).
For cases finding sufficient evidence to support finding of dedication to public use, see
Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P. 954
(1930); Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116
P.2d 420 (1941); Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395,
326 P.2d 107 (1958); Clark v. Erekson, 9 Utah
2d 212, 341 P2d 424 (1959).
Mere use by public of private alley in common
with owners of alley does not show a dedication
thereof to public use, or vest any right in public
to the way. Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah 2d 340,
273 P2d 720 (1954).
Though dedication of one's land to public use
should not be lightly regarded, where a narrow,
private dead-end street was used by neighboring residents and the general public without
interference for at least 25 years, and where the
city had platted it as a public street in 1915 and
had thereafter paved it and maintained a public street sign at its entrance, and where plaintiff who owned the fee simple interest in the
land on which the street was situated had not
paid any taxes on the street property for 25
years, this combination of factors was sufficient
to justify finding that the street had been
dedicated to public use. Bonner v. Sudbury, 18
Utah 2d 140, 417 P2d 646 (1966).
Clear and convincing quantum and quality of
proof is required for the establishment of a
public thoroughfare or taking of another's property. Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493
P.2d 639 (1972).
Where the trial court found that public had
used north-south road for 12 years and that
during this time, the road was ten feet wide,
anu1 the court found that there was insufficient
use of an east-west road by the public to make
it a public road, these findings of fact, supported by substantial evidence, compelled a
holding that the north-south road was a public
highway ten feet wide and that no public highway existed on the east-west road. Western
Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987)
Because there were material issues of fact as
to whether people using a road were members
of the general public or landowners in the area,
who had either a private right or permission to
use the road, and there were conflicting statements as to public use of the road for recre-
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ational purposes, summary judgment in favor
of the proponents of dedication was erroneous.
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 p 2 d
1097 (Utah 1995).
finding tAat a roacf was not a pudYic thoroughfare was proper based on evidence that the
road was generally used only during the <j e e r
hunting season and was frequently closer to
the public at other times, and that its u s e
during the hunting season was by permission of
the owners. Campbell v. Box Elder County 9(32
P.2d 806 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

became a "public thoroughfare"' when the public
acquired a general right of passage. Morris v
Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916).
Width of roadway.
Although there was some incidental evidence
in the record regarding the width of the road in
question, it was not error for the district court
to refuse to determine the width of the road
when that issue was not the focus of the litigation. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v.
Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225
(Utah 1995).
Generally, the width of a public road is determined according to what is reasonable and
necessary under all the facts and circumstances. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P2d 910 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996).

"Thoroughfare" and "public thorough,
fare" distinguished.
Under identically worded predecessor s e c .
tion, a "thoroughfare" was a place or w a v
through which there is passing or travel, it

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d H i g h w a y s ,
Streets, and Bridges § 24 et seq.

C.J.S. — 39A C.J.S. Highways § 15.

72-5-105. Highways once established continue until abandoned.
All public highways once established shall continue to be highways until
abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction
over any highway, or by other competent authority.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 90; C. 1^ 5 3 >
27-12-90; renumbered by L. 1998, ch. ^ 7 0 ,
8 133»
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 am^ n( }_
NOTEfc

T 0

ANALYSIS

effective March 21, 1998, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as §
27-12-90, and made a stylistic change.
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DECISIONS
authorities, rights of abutting owners will not
be affected. Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501,
126 P. 959 (1912).

Abutting owners' rights.
Bridges.
Notice of abandonment required.
Platted but unused streets.
Power of cjty to abandon.
Requisites for abandonment.
Abutting owners' rights.
While public may abandon street or h i g h w a v
insofar as it affects rights of public t h e ^ e j n
such abandonment, however, will not aff ec t
rights of abutting owner with respect to u^ e 0 f
easement for ingress and egress to and fror^ n i s
premises. Hague v. J u a b County Mill & E } e v a _
tor Co., 37 Utah 290, 107 P. 249 (1910).
Whara pr&paAy Js st?)d with rafarapaa £0 a
map or plat showing it to abut on a public
highway, this constitutes an implied cover i a n t
that highway will not be obstructed or interfered with by grantor. While highway by al^ an _
donment may pass out of jurisdiction of l o c a i

Bridges.
Bridge owned by county was an essential
part of road and could not be abandoned except
as provided by statute. Adney v. State Rd.
Comm'n, 67 Utah 567, 248 P. 811 (1926).
Notice of abandonment required.
County commissioners may not order abandonment of a county road unless notice thereof
is given. Ercanbrack v Judd, 524 P2d 595
(Utah 1974).'
Platted but u n u s e d s t r e e t s .
Corporation was able to give good tit)e to
land platted for streets and alleyways but
never used as such, since under proviso in
former law, road not used or worked for nvr
years ceased to be a highway. Mallory
Taggart, 24 Utah 2d 267, 470 P.2d 254 (1970).
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
State of Utah, et. al,
Plaintiffs

:
:

Memorandum Decision

vs.

:

Date: June 16,2004

Randy Butler, et. al.,

:

Case Number: 000403327*

:

Division VH: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendants

This matter came before the Court for trial on June 1,2004. The case continued through
7 days of testimony concluding with closing arguments on June 15. The Court has taken the
matter under advisement and now renders this Memorandum Decision.
The Plaintiffs have asked this Court to determine that a route described as the Benny
Creek Road is a public highway under Utah Code Annotated section 72-5-104,1953 as
amended.1 In addition, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to exercise its equitable powers to restrain the
Defendantsfromblocking the roadfrompublic use and declare a right of way along the road for
the public, although it seems that a declaration that the route is a public highway would render a
further declaration of a public right of way to be superfluous. The Plaintiffs also ask for damages
of $10.00 per day since July 29,1997 when notice was provided to the Defendants that they were

formerly 27-12-89, renumbered in 1998. The statute has
remained substantially unchanged since first enacted by the
Territorial Legislature in 1886, Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v.
Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646 at 648 (Utah, 1929).
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improperly blocking a public highway under Utah Code Annotated section 72-7-104 and an
identical Utah County Ordinance (17-3-1-1).
In a case such as this the Court is required to consider "reconstruction of historical facts
concerning timing, nature, and the extent of public usage

[Witnesses are required to dredge

the recesses of their minds for aged memories," Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910 at 912 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996). Over 60 witnesses have testified in this trial recalling facts and circumstances from
as early as 1927. Nearly half provided the Court with memories preceding 1960. None of the
witnesses, in the view of this Court, attempted to mis-lead or do anything other than give an
honest and complete recitation of what they recall. Even so, when the testimony is compared to
pictures, maps and other testimony some statements must be given greater credibility than others.
Public Highway
Three factors must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order for a route to
be deemed a dedicated highway, abandoned to the use of the public under U.C.A. section 72-5104: "there must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period often years.
. • .Once the technical provisions of [the statute] have been satisfied, the road is a 'public
highway.' The court has no discretion to ignore that fact." Campbell v. Box Elder County. 962
P.2d 806 at 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) citing Heber Citv Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 at 310
(Utah, 1997). There is no requirement of proof of the owner's intent to offer the road to the
public. Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches. 639 P.2d 211 at 213 (Utah, 1981); see also Draper
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City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097 at 1099 (Utah, 1995) and Thurman v. Bvram. 626 P.2d
445 at 449 (Utah 1981).
Continuous Use
Continuous use is established where the public has "made a continuous and uninterrupted
use of the road as often as they found it convenient or necessary," Campbell. 962 P.2d at 809.
The "use may be continuous though not constant,... provided it occurred as often as the
claimant had occasion to chose to pass. Mere intermission is not interruption." Id. at 809 (citing
Richards v. Pines Ranch. Inc., 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977).
In this case the evidence was that a route of travelfromU.S. Highway 89 near the
"Birdseye Church" has extended west toward the Uintah National Forest since before the
memory of any witness. An ariel photograph taken in 1949 clearly shows the road extending
from the highway into the vicinity of the national forest. Madge Truman and Ginnie Johnson
both testified that their family owned the property now owned by Defendant Randy Butler
(herinafter "Gardner Property")from1927 until 1963 and that they lived on the property along
the road from 1925 or 1933 (depending upon which sister is considered) until 1949. Diuing that
time the road was traveled often and no attempts were made by the family to restrict or deny
access to the road to any members of the public. One witness for the Defendants, Lloyd Jackson,
testified that he trailed sheep across the Gardner property between 1947 and 1955. He also
hunted in the area every year until 1965. He testified that his father "made arrangements" with
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Mr. Gardner to move the sheep across the property on the way to the forest service property. The
Defendant insists that this travel was, therefore, by permission. However, the witness did not
participate in the discussion and both parties to the actual arrangements are deceased. It was
apparent that the Gardners had cattle on their property. Care needed to be taken to not allow the
sheep to get into the cattle-the herds needed to be kept apart. The conversations and
arrangements were just as likely an effort to work out the details of the operation as to gain
permission to travel a road. Contrasted with that testimony are the statements by Duane Newitt,
Ron Davis, Reneae Swenson, Glen Roberts, Norris Dalton, Youd Barney, Hugh Tangren, Don
Daley, Craig Ingram, and Glen Thatcher. All of these witnesses personally used the road for
recreation including hunting, fishing, camping and sightseeing in the 1940fs and 50fs. None
encountered locked gates or sought permission. None were ever preventedfromtraveling the
road. Several, including Norris Dalton and Hugh Tangren, drove vehicles well into forest service
property.
There was testimony that travel was impacted by the weather. Springs or bogs in the
road were worse in wetter times of the year and occasionally restricted travel by vehicle. Winter
snow was not plowed off of this mountain road. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear and
convincing that for at least 10 years prior to 1958 the road was open and traveled by the public as
often as necessary or convenient, interrupted only by naturally occurring conditions such as
groundwater (spring water) in wet years and snow in the winter.
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Mr. Butler and his parents (J. Lee Butler and Diane Butler) recalled family hunting trips
between 1958 and 1962 when family members accompanied the family patriarch, Barney Newitt
(Diane Butler's father, Randy Butler's grandfather) to a location in Sanpete County to obtain a
key before traveling up the road to camp just below the bog on property now owned by
Defendants Blaine and Linda Evans. Randy Butler has a particularly vivid memory from
approximately 1962 when, at age 7, he saw his grandfather get out of the truck to unlock a gate
and spotted a buck which he shot before opening the gate to allow continued travel on the road.
Contrasted against this vivid and believable recollection, however, is other important evidence.
Only the Poulson family has been identified as property owners who lived in Sanpete County.
Bamey Newitt and Grandmother Poulsen, to whom he would have spoken in 1958 to 1962 about
a key are both deceased. Steve Poulson testified that to his knowledge the only locked gate on
the Poulson property during that time was on a side road south off the Benny Creek road toward
an old bunkhouse. Duane Newitt, the brother of Diane Butler, testified that he camped and
hunted with the family during those years and does not recall any locked gates. Nineteen other
witnesses testified that they traveled the road for a variety of purposes during that time and never
encountered any locked gates. None of the other witnesses ever felt it necessary to obtain
permissionfromproperty owners to travel the road.
Other witnesses testified for the Defendants that there were locked gates on the road.
Virgil Neeves testified that between 1958 and 1980 there was a locked gate near the Gardner
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home (the last home traveling west toward the forest service property, now occupied by
Defendant Randy Butler) which was locked most of the time. He specifically recalled a "cock
fight"2 up the road in 1972 when only people who were supposed to participate were given keys
to the gate. A cock fight, of course, is an illegal activity and the one time use of the gate to
discourage discovery or participation by persons not known to the participants can hardly be
considered to be a termination of general public access. Mr. Neeves' other access to the area was
usually across countryfromthe property he worked to the north (the Dixon Ranch) to work on
water diversion works along Bennie Creek. He saw people stuck on the road and recalls a cable
across the road to stop cars. His memories are simply confused and inconsistent with all of the
other testimony about obstructions on the road in question. There is evidence of a cable across a
side road belonging to the Poulson family.
Mike Condley testified that he lived in the area from 1970 until 1979. Although he does
not recall any locks after 1979, hefirmlyrecalled a locked gate near the Gardner (Butler) home.
However, no other witness corroborates this point and descriptions of locked gates by the Butler

2

"Cockfights" are illegal contests between roosters bred and
trained to fight typically involving wagering and serious threat
of injury to the animals. Presently outlawed by U.C.A. section
76-9-301(1)(e), the practice has been illegal in this State since
at least 1898. The Revised Statutes of the State of Utah,
January 1, 1898 section 4454 provided that "any person who shall
keep or use any . . . fowl, or bird, for the purpose of fighting
. . . and any person who shall be a party to or be present as a
spectator at any such fighting . . . shall be adjudged guilty of
a misdemeanor."
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family, Defendant Blaine Evans and others put the locked gates farther west, near the present
cattle guard between the Butler home and forest service property.
Finally Elizabeth Condley testified that between 1967 and 1977 the gates were never
locked in the summer but that they were locked late in every fall. However, her testimony was
that she traveled the road on horseback during the summer. There was nothing given to explain
how she could have known that the gate was locked in the fall.
The heaviest use of the property was clearly for hunting deer and elk in the fall season.
Several dozen witness testified that they personally hunted the area between 1958 and 1980 and
never encountered locked gates or were otherwise preventedfromusing the road. Division of
Wildlife Resources officers Gurley and Briggs both patrolled the area to check hunters during
that period. Dale Gurley, in particular, patrolled between 1968 and 1991 sometimes observing as
many as 25 or 30 hunters in the forest service area who had traveled up the Benny Creek road to
hunt. Officer Gurley never encountered locked gates and never needed permission to access the
area to check on hunters and fishermen. Kent Cornaby, Forest Service supervisor, routinely
traveled the road during the 60's and 70fs. Entrance to the forest service during that time was
marked by signs.
Shirlene Otteson testified that her family purchased the Gardner property in 1964 and
owned it until 1981. During that time she was regularly on the property with her husband and
children. The road was considered and treated by her family as a public road during that time.
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No attempt was made to close the road during that time. There was testimony that one defense
witness, John Mendenhall, was told by Ms. Otteson's father, Mr. Roach, to stop hunting and
leave the property. However he testified that he was a teenager with three other teenagers and no
adult. He was hunting well off the road on the Roach (Gardner/now Butler) property. Ordering
teenagers to leave in such a circumstance hardly equates with restricting travel on the road.
There was testimony that the road is periodically used to deliver irrigation water to
property along the road and that when that occurs, the road becomes impassable. However,
neither the Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families used that method of irrigation,
covering a period from 1925 to 1981.
There was substantial testimony about signs along the road. The Defendants have
insisted that there were many signs, perpendicular to the road, coupled with posts painted yellow
and orange clearly designating the area as private property. Most of Plaintiffs* witnesses testified
that they saw the signs but considered them warning against leaving the road but not a warning
against traveling on the road. The evidence was that the signs were placed on various locations
along the edge of the road west of the Gardner home and, in particular, around a wire gate in the
vicinity of a present cattle guard.
Utah Code Annotated section 23-20-14 provides a mechanism for private property
owners to restrict hunter access to their property by posting:
"Properly posted" means that '*No Trespassing" signs or a minimum of 100 square
inches of bright yellow, bright orange, or flourescent paint are displayed at all
Page 8 o f
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corners, fishing streams crossing property lines, roads, gates, and rights-of-way
entering the land. If metal fence posts are used, the entire exterior side must be
painted."
The plain and obvious intent of the statute is to require physical notation or warning at the
entrance or on the edge of property. Members of the public encountering such signs would have
to conclude, based upon the statute, that they were at a property line or on the edge of private
property, meaning that where they are standing is not restricted. Signs and painted posts along a
fence running parallel to a road, regardless of the physical juxtaposition of the sign, more clearly
indicate the fence as a boundary than prohibiting travel along the roadfromwhich the signs can
be seen. The signs and painted posts in this case clearly did what the plaintiffs' witnesses
assumed-they prohibited travel off of the road, not on the road.
There was testimony regarding four gates on the Benny Creek road between U.S.
Highway 89 and the Uintah National Forest. Traveling westfromthe highway, thefirstgate
location is near the Gardner home (presently the Randy and Donna Butler home). All but one
witness described the versions of this gate prior to 1996 as a drift wire gate that was never
locked. All testified and assumed it was used to assist in livestock operations and not to restrict
general travel on the road.
The second gate to the west was within 100 yards of a present cattle gate. Also a wire
gate, most witnesses did not recall any locks and that the gate was only occasionally closed.
These witnesses assumed that, again, the gate was for use with livestock operations and not

Page 9 of

18

intended to restrict travel on the road. There was also testimony, however, that this gate was
locked on occasion after 1980 and the implication was that this was the gate unlocked by Barney
Newitt in the late 50fs and early 60fs. Remnants of the gate still exist, including a weathered
piece of plywood which was brought into court. This evidence is simply too skimpy and too
removed to conclude that the fence was locked and signed to disrupt public travel particularly in
the face of all the witness who regularly traveled the road and recalled no locks or road
restrictions.
There was testimony of a "white gate" constructed of lumber and located near an ancient
bridge spanning one of the ditches or streams crossing the road. One witness testified that the
gate had been locked on one occasion and one exhibit includes a picture of a yellow pole
described as the remnants of the bridge. However, again, this minimal evidence is overwhelmed
by the substantial testimony of persons who used and drove the road on all seasons between 1925
and 1980 without encountering any locked gate.
The fourth gate is at the entrance to the forest service property. There has been a sign
indicating the entrance to the forest service for at least 35 years and the forest service property
has clearly been fenced in the memory of all witnesses. A sign, still on the gate, asks users to
"please close the gate."3 The obstruction was obviously intended to restrict the travel of cattle

3

What was formerly a wire livestock gate has been replaced
with a cattle guard. A metal gate nearby allows horses and
livestock to move through the fence when required. The sign is
presently on the metal gate.
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and sheep, not people.
It is established, by clear and convincing evidence that the road was in continuous use by
the public.
Public Thoroughfare
The term "thoroughfare" is not defined in any Utah statute. Competent legal authority
defines the term as "a street or way opening at both ends into another street or public highway, so
that one can go through and get out of it without returning. It differs from a cul de sac, which is
open only at one end."4 The Utah Supreme Court has stated that:
[w]hile it is difficult to fix a standard by which the measure what is a public use
or a public thoroughfare, it can be said here that the road was used by many and
different persons for a variety of purposes; that it was open to all who desired to
use it; that the use made of it was as general and extensive as the situation and
surroundings would permit, had the road been formally laid out as a public
highway by public authority."
Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos. 75 Utah 384,285 P. 646 at 648 (Utah 1929).
The Court has also stated that a "'thoroughfare' is a place or way through which there is
passing or travel. It becomes a 'public thoroughfare' when the public have a generalrightof
passage." Gillmor v. Carter, 15 U.2d 280, 391 P.2d 426 at 428 (Utah 1964).
In another case evidence that the road was generally impassable, that the road failed to
connect or lead to public property and that there had been only minimal maintenance were

4

Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Banks-Baldwin Law Publishing
Company, Cleveland: 1946.
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reasons to overturn a determination by summary judgment that a proposed road was a highway
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 at 1100-1101 (Utah 1995). Of course the
Draper City case did not determine that the road known as the "Lower Corner Canyon Road"
could not be determined to be a public highway in the face of such evidence, only that the issue
could not be resolved via summary judgment. This case is in a substantially different posture.
This Court concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, the following facts about the
Benny Creek road. The road or path connects U.S. Highway 89 and the Uintah National Forest.
Paths and trailsfromthe top or terminus of the road travel over the mountain and connect to the
Nebo Loop Road. During certain seasons and at certain times between 1925 and 1980 there were
springs or ditches which created bogs making travel through or around difficult or impossible.
Nevertheless, there was regular maintenance performed on the road by Utah County, the United
States Forest Service and landowners during that time. The road was graded as needed or
following significant storms during the 1950's. The County has had a contract with the forest
service requiring them to maintain the road from 1974 through the present time. There was no
evidence that the County has not honored that contract. One witness for the Defense testified
that he operated a grader for the County and only gradedfromthe church to the Gardner home
for several years. Others, however, testified that they graded the roadfromthe termination of
oiled road in Birdseye to the forest service property at least twice per year during the decades of
the 60fs and 70's. The testimony established a wide variety of uses including travel to the forest
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service and adjoining private property forfishing,deer hunting, elk hunting, cougar hunting
(during the winter), hiking, family outings, general sightseeing, labor on irrigation headwaters,
movement of cattle and sheep, law enforcement related to wildlife regulations, and maintenance
of forest trails and signs by forest service employees. Vehicles, horses, trailers, hikers, bikes and
motorcycles were all driven at various times the entire length of the road ending on forest service
property.
The Court concludes that the road was a public thoroughfare before 1980.
10 years
The statute specifies a 10 year period. This Courtfinds,by clear and convincing evidence
that even if it is concluded (which this Court does not) that the road was gated and locked in the
late 50fs and early 60's as described by the Butlers, the road was used as necessary and
convenient by the public for more than 10 years before that time and, again, 10 years after that
time.
Reasonable and Necessary Width
Having determined that the Benny Creek road was a public highway before 1980 by clear
and convincing evidence, this Court must also determine the reasonable and necessary width of
the highway, Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910 at 914 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), U.C.A. Section 72-5104(3). The only testimony on this point was that of Clyde Naylor, a qualified engineer and
longtime director of public works for Utah County. Mr. Naylor testified that a width of 20 feet
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plus a three foot shoulder on each side for a total width of 26 feet was reasonably necessary for
anticipated travel. There being no evidence to the contrary the Court finds that the width of the
roadway in this case should be 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder on each side.5
Injunction
As noted above, the issuance of an injunction may be mooted by the determination that
the road is a public highway. Nevertheless, it is the order of this Court that the Defendants
refrainfromblocking, locking or otherwise interfering with public access to the Benny Creek
road. It should be noted that the determination expressed in this decision takes into account the
occasional use of the road for transportation of irrigation water. While there was little or no
evidence that the road was actually used in lieu of an irrigation pipe or ditch before 1980, the
testimony was not controverted that with the present, improved condition of the road, the
occasional presence of irrigation water on the road will not substantially interfere with public use

5

The Court notes that a legal description of the centerline
of the road generated from a survey of the road itself was
introduced intQ evidence. The description was challenged by
counsel for the Defendants since it appears to lie in a different
township or range than the legal description of the Defendants'
properties. Testimony was also presented that indicated that
several years ago the adjoining property owners agreed to
establish their respective boundaries as the center of the
roadway and confirmed that agreement by recorded boundary line
agreement. No expert testimony was presented to assist this
Court to determine if there is a conflict in the two positions or
how such a conflict, if it exists, should be resolved. The Court
merely determines, today, that the road as it presently exists is
a public highway, 20 feet wide with a three foot shoulder on each
side.
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of the road.
Fines
U.C.A. section 72-7-104 provides that any person who installs, places or maintains a
structure within the right-of-way of a highway must remove the structure within ten days of
notice. Upon failure to remove the structure "[a] highway authority may recover:... (b) $10 for
each day the installation remained within theright-of-wayafter notice was complete." Notice to
Mr. and Mrs. Butler was completed on July 29,1997. Calculated from 10 days after service to
the date of thisdecision, 2,561 days have passed.
Nevertheless, several factors must also be considered. There was testimony that a locked
gate was constructed in 1996 by Mr. Butler. There was also substantial testimony that many
people were unable to travel the road after that time without gaining permission or using a key
provided by Mr. and Mrs. Butler. However, one exhibit shows a gate created by the County
which allowed travel past the Butler gate, although admonishing travelers to close the gate and
stay on the road until arriving at the forest service. As noted above there have historically been
gates across the road for purposes unrelated to obstruction of traffic. An unlocked gate is
consistent with this pattern and would not be considered to violate the right-of-way declared
today. Consequently, for some of the time since construction of the metal Butler gate the road
has been obstructed and for some of the time it has not. No evidence was presented to clarify
how many of the intervening 2,561 days were days when the road was obstructed and how many
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were not. The Plaintiffs, as the moving party in seeking to obtain the penalty, had the burden of
providing specific evidence of the number of days the Defendants have been in violation. Merely
showing initial service and testimony that persons were stoppedfromtime to time during the last
6 or 7 years does not meet that burden. Inasmuch as the Court cannot determine with reasonable
precision the number of days during which a violation of the State statute and County ordinances
existed no penally can be imposed.
Costs of Court
The Plaintiffs are, however, as the prevailing party entitled to recover reasonable costs of
court to be established by affidavit.
Conclusion
In this decision the Court has avoided reference to facts and circumstances after 1980.
The Court is convinced by what it considers to be clear and convincing evidence that a public
highway was established on the Benny Creek Road decades before the Butler, Evans or even
Condley families ever came into possession of the property abutting the road. As a member of
the public of this county, state and nation this Court is ashamed that these Defendants have had
to suffer abuse at the hands of the general public. Their cattle have been stolen and killed. Their
property has been littered. Their lives have been threatened. The distancefrom"the valley"
gives a certain solitude and quiet peace equally attractive to the people who have made Birdseye
their home, people who wish to enjoy the natural beauty as visitors and people who wish to
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escape rules of behavior. Bullet holes in signs and beer cans and used syringes littering the
landscape are not proud symbols of Utah and America. That said, it is also clear that other good
and responsible people have used and cherished the area. It was obviously a particularly special
place for the Newitt family. Grandchildren have caught their first fish in Benny Creek and
dozens and dozens of hunters have relished a yearly visit to Deer Hollow-which was not
accidentally named.
It is the business of this Court, sitting in equity, to resolve the needs and desires of
competing interests. The law properly demands great deference to private ownership and
property rights. In this case, however, the evidence is clear and convincing that the road in
question has been a public thoroughfare connecting a national forest and recreation area to a
national highway for decades and generations.
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law and an
order consistent with this decision.

A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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This matter came before the Court on a bench trial consisting of June 1st, 2nd, 7 th , 8th, 9th, 10th,
14th, and 15th, 2004. Plaintiff Utah County was represented by M. Cort Griffin and Robert J. Moore,
Deputy Utah County Attorneys. Plaintiff State of Utah, by and through its Department of Natural
Resources, Division of Wildlife Resources, was represented by Martin B. Bushman, Assistant Utah
Attorney General. Defendants Randy Butler, Donna Butler, Blaine Evans, and Donna Evans were
represented by Mark E. Arnold and Scott Wiggins, of Arnold & Wiggins, P.C.
The Court has reviewed the file, heard evidence at trial, issued a Memorandum Decision
dated June 16, 2004, and upon being advised in the premises, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court makes the following findings of fact based upon the clear and convincing evidence
presented at trial, the admissions of Defendants, and the addition of the Butler Family Trust:
1.

That Defendants Randy Butler and Donna Butler are individuals residing in Utah County,
Utah, and are the trustees and/or successor trustees of the Butler Family Trust dated the April
11,2002, which is the owner of record of certain real properties more particularly described
as follows:
COM N 89 DEG 58'01"E ALONG SEC LINE 2661.78 FT FR NW COR
SEC 26, T10S, R3E, SLM; S 89 DEG 29'48"E 402.48 FT; S 12 DEG
07'30"W1083.73 FT; N 84 DEG 25'25"W 491.21 FT; N 86 DEG 46'28"W
114.33 FT; S 77 DEG 44'11"W 78.72 FT; S 59 DEG 32'05"W 73.23 FT; S
48 DEG 34'23"W 81.42 FT; S 66 DEG 14*50"W 60.21 FT; S 88 DEG
10'49"W 73.18 FT; N 79 DEG 55*36"W 86.59 FT; N 20 DEG 49"W 444.56
FT; N 13 DEG 12'01"W 265.17 FT; N 31 DEG 28'45"W 353.97 FT; N 61
DEG 03'58"W 244.51 FT; N 16 DEG 47'16"W 346.47 FT; N 12 DEG
28'38"W 368.34 FT; N 89 DEG 26*04"W 1047.86 FT; N 1 DEG 42'24"W
672.01 FT; S 8 DEG 50'11"E 1330.15 FT; S 1 DEG 47'12"E 1315.76 FT; N
89 DEG 58'01"E 1330.89 FT TO BEG. AREA 56.76 ACRES.
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ALSO: COM SW COR SEC 23, T10S, R3E, SLM; N 1 DEG 42'24"W
671.48 FT; S 89 DEG 26*04"E 1047.86 FT; S 12 DEG 28'38"E 368.34 FT;
S 16 DEG 47'16"E 346.47 FT; S 61 DEG 03'58"E 244.51 FT; S 31 DEG
28'45"E 353.97 FT; S 13 DEG 12'01"E 265.17 FT; S 20 DEG 00'49"E 444.56
FT; N 79 DEG 55'36"W 30.66 FT; N 81 DEG 57'45"W 80 FT; N 77 DEG
09'25"W 503.28 FT; S 83 DEG 57'05"W 131.47 FT; N 83 DEG 21'17"W
364.54 FT; N 65 DEG 44'39"W 278.69 FT; N 55 DEG 47'09"W 218.59 FT;
N 63 DEG 31'54"W 325.32 FT; N 587.40 FT TO BEG. AREA 50.30
ACRES.
ALSO: COM. AT NE COR OF SEC 27, T 10 S, R 3 E, SLM; S 8.90 CHS;
N 63 3/8 W 19.86 CHS; E 17.77 CHS TO BEG. AREA 7.81 ACRES.
ALSO: SE1/4 OF SE1/4 OF SEC 22, T 10 S, R 3 E, SLM. AREA 40
ACRES.
2.

That Defendants Blaine Evans and Linda Evans are individuals residing in Utah County,
State of Utah, and are the owners of record of certain real properties more particularly
described as follows:
BEG. 10 CHS S OF NW COR OF SEC 26, T 10 S, R 3 E, SLM; S TO THE
TOP OF THE "GARDNER KNOLL" 19 CHS M OR 1; N-NE ALONG
EXISTING FENCE LINE TO A PT S 63 E 8.65 CHS TO EXISTING COR
POST; N 63 W 8.65 CHS M OR 1 TO BEG. AREA 8.22 ACRES M OR 1.
ALSO: COM AT SW COR. SEC. 27, R10S, R3E, SLB&M.; N 0 DEG
10*6"W 2651.35 FT; N 0 DEG 10'6"W 2651.35 FT; S 89 DEG 58'10"E
2640.89 FT; S 89 DEG 58'10"E 1467.41 FT; S 63 DEG 23'0"E 1316.6 FT;
S 0 DEG 21'14"E 2078.28 FT; S 0 DEG 21'14"E 1333.77 FT; N 89 DEG
42'26"W 1323.7 FT; S 0 DEG 18'27"E 1331.74 FT; N 89 DEG 37'13"W
1324.8 FT; N 89 DEG 37'13"W 2649.6 FT TO BEG. AREA 597.515 AC.
ALSO: Sl/2 OF SW1/4 & SW1/4 OF SE1/4 OF SEC 22, T 10 S, R 3 E,
SLM. AREA 120 ACRES.
ALSO: Nl/2 OF SW1/4 & Nl/2 OF SE 1/4 SEC 22, T 10 S, R 3 E, SLM.
AREA 160 ACRES.
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3.

That the Bennie Creek Road (hereinafter referred to as "Road") commences at or near
Birdseye, Utah at a junction with U.S. Highway 89, located in Section 25, Township 10
South, Range 3 East Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

4.

That from the Road's junction with U.S. Highway 89, it continues approximately 2.5 miles
in a westerly direction through Sections 25,26,27 and 22, Township 10 South, Range 3 East
Salt Lake Base and Meridian until it reaches the western edge of the Uinta National Forest.

5.

That over 60 witnesses testified at trial recalling facts and circumstances from as early as
1927. Nearly half provided the Court with memories preceding 1960. None of the
witnesses, in view of the Court, attempted to mis-lead or do anything other than give an
honest and complete recitation of what they recall. Even so, when the testimony is compared
to pictures, maps and other testimony some statements must be given greater credibility than
others.

6.

That the Road follows a route of travel from U.S. Highway 89 near the "Birdseye Church"
and has extended west toward the Uinta National Forest since before the memory of any
witness.

7.

That an ariel photo taken in 1946 clearly shows the Road extending from the highway into
the vicinity of the national forest.

&.

That Madge Truman and Ginnie Johnson both testified that their family owned the property
now owned by Defendants Randy Butler and Donna Butler (hereinafter referred to as
"Gardner Property") from 1927 until 1963 and that they lived on the property along the Road
from 1925 or 1933 (depending upon which sister is considered) until 1949. During that time
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the Road was traveled by the public often and no attempts were made by the family to restrict
or deny access to the Road to any members of the public.
That Loyd Jackson, a defense witness, testified that he trailed sheep across the Gardner
property between 1947 and 1955. He also hunted in the area every year until 1965. He
testified that his father "made arrangements" with Mr. Gardner to move sheep across the
Gardner's property on the way to the forest service property. Defendants insist that this
travel was, therefore, by permission. However, Mr. Jackson did not participate in the
discussions and both parties to the actual arrangements are deceased. It was apparent that
the Gardners had cattle on their property. Care needed to be taken to not allow the sheep to
get into the cattle, as the herds needed to be kept apart. The conversations and arrangements
were just as likely an effort to work out the details of the operation as to gain permission to
travel the Road.
That Duane Newitt, Ron Davis, Renae Swenson, Glen Roberts, Norris Dalton, Youd Barney,
Hugh Tangren, Don Daley, Craig Ingram, and Glen Thatcher, all personally used the Road
for recreation including hunting, fishing, camping, and sightseeing in the 1940fs and 50's.
None of them encountered locked gates on the Road or sought permission to use the Road.
None of them were ever prevented from traveling the Road. Several, including Norris Dalton
and Hugh Tangren, drove vehicles well into forest service property.
That travel on the Road was impacted by the weather. Springs or bogs in the Road were
worse in the wetter times of the year and occasionally restricted travel by vehicle, but not by
foot, horseback, or horse drawn wagon. Winter snow was not plowed off the Road.
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Nevertheless, the evidence is clear and convincing that for at least 10 years prior to 1958 the
road wsis open and traveled by the public as often as necessary or convenient, interrupted
vehicular travel only by naturally occurring conditions such as groundwater (spring water)
in wet years and snow in the winter. The springs and bogs in the Road were passable on
foot, horseback or by wagon even when vehicle access was restricted.
That Defendant Randy Butler and his parents (J. Lee Butler and Diane Butler), defense
witnesses, recalled family hunting trips between 1958 and 1962 when family members
accompanied the family patriarch, Barney Newitt (Diane Butler's father, Randy Butler's
grandfather) to a location in Sanpete County to obtain a key before traveling up the Road to
camp just below the bog on the property now owned by Defendants Blaine and Linda Evans.
Randy Butler has a particularly vivid memory from approximately 1952 when, at age 7, he
saw his grandfather get out of the truck to unlock a gate and spotted a buck which he shot
before opening the gate to allow continued travel on the road. Contrasted against this vivid
and believable recollection, however, is other important evidence. Only the Poulson family
has been identified as property owners who lived in Sanpete County. Barney Newitt and
Grandmother Poulsen, to whom he would have spoken in 1958 to 1962 about a key are both
deceased. Steve Poulson testified that to his knowledge the only locked gate on the Poulson
property during that time was on a side road branching south off the Road toward an old
bunkhouse. Duane Newitt, the brother of Diane Butler, testified that he camped and hunted
with the family during those years and does not recall any locked gates. Nineteen other
witnesses testified that they traveled the Road for a variety of purposes during that time and
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never encountered any locked gates. None of the other witnesses ever felt it necessary to
obtain permission from property owners to travel the Road.
13.

That Virgil Neeves, a defense witness, testified that between 1958 and 1980 there was a
cable gate across a cattle guard west of the Gardner home (the last home traveling west
toward the forest service property, now occupied by Defendants Randy Butler and Donna
Butler) which was locked most of the time. He specifically recalled a "cock fight" up the
Road in 1972 when only people who were supposed to participate were given keys to the
gate. A cock fight, of course, is an illegal activity and the one time use of the gate to
discourage discovery or participation by persons not known to the participants can hardly be
considered to be a termination of general public access. Mr. Neeves' other access to the area
was usually across country from the property he worked to the north (the Dixon Ranch) to
work on water diversion works along Bennie Creek. He saw people stuck on the Road and
recalls a cable across a cattle guard on the Road to stop cars. His memories are simply
confused and inconsistent with all of the other testimony about obstructions on the Road in
question. Further, there is evidence of a cable across a side road belonging to the Poulson
family, and a gate and cattle guard on the Road at the Forest Boundary.

14.

That Mike Condley, a defense witness, testified that he lived in the area from 1970 until
1979. Although he does not recall any locks after 1979, he firmly recalled a locked gate near
the Gardner (Butler) home. However, no other witness corroborates this point and
descriptions of locked gates by the Butler family, Defendant Blaine Evans and others put
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locked gates farther west, near the present cattle guard between the Butler home and forest
service property.
15.

That Elizabeth Condley, a defense witness, testified that between 1967 and 1977 the gates
were never locked in the summer but that they were locked late in every fall. However, her
testimony was that she traveled the Road on horseback during the summer. There was
nothing given to explain how she could have known that the gate was locked in the fall.

16.

That the heaviest use of the Road was clearly for hunting deer and elk in the fall season.
Several dozen witness testified that they personally hunted the area between 1958 and 1980
and never encountered locked gates or were otherwise prevented from using the Road.
Division of Wildlife Resources officer Gurley and Briggs patrolled the area to check hunters
and fishermen from 1958 through 1996. Dale Gurley, in particular, patrolled between 1968
and 1991 sometimes observing as many as 25 or 30 hunters in the forest service area who
had traveled up the Road to hunt. Officer Gurley never encountered locked gates and never
needed permission to access the area to check on hunters and fishermen. Kent Cornaby,
Forest Service supervisor, routinely traveled the Road during the 60's and 70fs for personal
and professional purposes. Entrance to the forest service during that time was marked by
signs.

17.

That Shirlene Otteson, a Plaintiffs witness, testified that her family purchased the Gardner
property in 1964 and owned it until 1981. During that time she was regularly on the property
with her husband and children. The Road was considered and treated by her family as a
public road during that time. No attempt was made to close the Road during that time.
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There was testimony that one defense witness, John Mendenhall, was told by Mrs. Otteson's
father, Mr. Roach, to stop hunting and leave his property. However, Mr. Mendenhall
testified that he was a teenager with three other teenagers and no adult. Mr. Mendenhall was
hunting well off the Road on the Roach (Gardner/now Butler) property. Ordering teenagers
to leave in such a circumstance hardly equates with restricting travel on the Road.
That there was testimony that the Road is periodically used to deliver irrigation water to
property along the Road and that when that occurs, the Road becomes impassable. However,
neither the Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families used that method of irrigation,
covering a period from 1925-1981. A clear and convincing majority of witnesses further
traveled the Road unrestricted by irrigation practices.
That there was substantial testimony about signs along the Road. The Defendants have
insisted that there were many signs, perpendicular to the Road, coupled with posts painted
yellow and orange clearly designating the area as private property. Most of Plaintiffs'
witnesses testified that they saw the signs but considered them warning against leaving the
Road but not a warning against traveling on the Road. The evidence was that the signs were
placed on various locations along the edge of the Road west of the Gardner home to the
forest boundary and, in particular, around a wire gate in the vicinity of a present cattle guard.
Members of the public encountering signs posting property as provided by Utah Code Ann.
§23-20-14 would have to conclude, based upon Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14, that they were
at a property line or on the edge of private property, meaning that where they are standing
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is not restricted. Signs and painted posts along a fence running parallel to a road, regardless
of the physical juxtaposition of the sign, more clearly indicate the fence as a boundary than
prohibiting travel along the road from which the signs can be seen. The signs and painted
posts in this case clearly did what the Plaintiffs' witnesses assumed, they prohibited travel
off of the Road, not on the Road. There was no testimony that any signs stated "Road
Closed."
That there was testimony regarding four gates on the Road between U.S. Highway 89 and
the Uinta National Forest. Traveling west from the highway, the first gate location is near the
Gardner home (presently the Randy and Donna Butler home). All but one witness described
the versions of this gate prior to 1996 as a drift wire gate that was never locked. All testified
and believed it was used to assist in livestock operations and not to restrict general travel on
the Road.
The second gate to the west was within 100 yards of a present cattle gate. Also a wire gate,
most witnesses did not recall any locks and that the gate was only occasionally closed. These
witnesses believed that, again, the gate was for use with livestock operations and not
intended to restrict travel on the Road. There was also testimony, however, that this gate was
locked on occasion after 1980 and the implication was that this was the gate unlocked by
Barney Newitt in the late 50's and early 60's. Remnants of the gate sill exist, including a
weathered piece of plywood which was brought into court. This evidence is simply too
skimpy and too removed to conclude that the fence was locked and signed to disrupt public
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travel particularly in the face of all the witness who regularly traveled the Road and recalled
no locks or road restrictions.
22.

That there was testimony of a "white gate" constructed of lumber and located near an ancient
bridge spanning one of the ditches or streams crossing the Road. One witness testified that
the gate had been locked on one occasion and one exhibit includes a picture of a yellow pole
described as the remnants of a bridge.

However, again, this minimal evidence is

overwhelmed by the substantial testimony of persons who used and drove the Road in all
seasons between 1925 and 1980 without encountering any locked gate.
23.

The fourth gate is at the entrance to the forest service property, which was formerly a wire
livestock gate, has been replaced with a cattle guard. A metal gate nearby allows horses and
livestock to move through the fence when required. There has been a sign there indicating
the entrance to the forest service for at least 35 years and the forest service property has
clearly been fenced in the memory of all witnesses. A sign, still on the gate, asks users to
"please close the gate."

The sign is presently on the metal gate. The obstruction was

obviously intended to restrict the travel of cattle and sheep, not people.
24.

That the Road connects U.S. Highway 89 and the Uinta National Forest. Paths and trails
from the top or terminus of the Road travel over the mountain and connect to the Nebo Loop
Road.

25.

That during certain seasons and at certain times between 1925 and 1980 there were springs
or ditches which created bogs at times making vehicular or wagon travel through or around
the bogs difficult or impossible. Nevertheless, travel by foot or horse was not restricted and
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there was regular maintenance performed on the Road by Utah County, the United States
Forest Service and landowners during that time. The Road was graded as needed or
following significant storms during the 1950's. The County has had a contract with the forest
service requiring them to maintain the Road from 1974 through the present time. There was
no evidence that the County has not honored that contract. One witness for the Defense
testified that he operated a grader for the County and only graded from the church to the
Gardner home for several years. Others, however, testified that they graded the Road from
the termination of oiled road in Birdseye to the forest service property at least twice per year
during the decades of the 60fs and 70's.
26.

That the testimony established a wide variety of uses including travel to the forest service and
adjoining private property for fishing, deer hunting, elk hunting, cougar hunting (during the
winter), hiking, family outings, general sightseeing, labor on irrigation headwaters,
movement of cattle and sheep, law enforcement related to wildlife regulations, and
maintenance of forest trails and signs by forest service employees.

27.

That vehicles, horses, trailers, hikers, bikes and motorcycles all at various times traveled the
entire length of the Road ending on forest service property.

28.

That the Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence that even if it is concluded (which
this Court does not) that the Road was gated and locked in the late 50's and early 60's as
described by the Butler's, the Road was used as necessary and convenient by the public for
more than 10 years before that time and, again, 10 years after that time.
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That the only testimony as to width of the Road was that of Clyde Naylor, a qualified
engineer and longtime director of public works for Utah County. Mr. Naylor testified that
a width of 20 feet plus a three foot shoulder on each side for a total width of 26 feet was
reasonably necessary for anticipated travel. There being no evidence to the contrary the Court
finds that the width of the roadway in this case should be 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder
on each side.
The Court notes that a legal description of the centerline of the Road generated from a survey
of the Road itself was introduced into evidence. The description was challenged by counsel
for the Defendants since it appears to lie in a different township or range than the legal
description of the Defendants' properties. Testimony was also presented that indicated that
several years ago the adjoining property owners agreed to establish their respective
boundaries as the center of the roadway and confirmed that agreement by recorded boundary
line agreement. No expert testimony was presented to assist this Court to determine if there
is a conflict in the two positions or how such a conflict, if it exists, should be resolved. The
Court merely determines, today, that the Road as it presently exists is a public highway, 20
feet wide with a three foot shoulder on each side.
There was testimony that a locked gate was constructed in 1996 by Mr. Butler. There was
also substantial testimony that many people were unable to travel the Road after that time
without gaining permission or using a key provided by Mr. and Mrs. Butler. However, one
exhibit shows a sign created by the County which allowed travel past the Butler gate,
although admonishing travelers to close the gate and stay on the Road until arriving at the
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forest service. As noted above there have historically been gates across the Road for
purposes unrelated to obstruction of traffic. An unlocked gate is consistent with this pattern
and would not be considered to violate the right-of-way declared today.
32.

That for some of the time since construction of the metal Butler gate in 1997 it has been
locked and the Road has been obstructed and for some of the time it has not. No evidence
was presented to clarify how many of the intervening 2,561 days were days when the Road
was obstructed and how many were not. The Plaintiffs, as the moving party in seeking to
obtain the penalty, had the burden of providing specific evidence of the number of days the
Defendants have been in violation. Merely showing initial service and testimony that
persons were stopped from time to time during the last 6 or 7 years does not meet that
burden. Inasmuch as the Court cannot determine with reasonable precision the number of
days during which a violation of the State statute and County ordinances existed no penalty
can be imposed.

33.

The Road has been a public thoroughfare connecting a national forest and recreation area to
a national roadway for decades and generations.

34.

That Plaintiffs are the prevailing party and are therefore entitled to recover reasonable costs
of court to be established by affidavit.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court hereby makes the following Conclusions of Law relying in whole or in part upon

the foregoing Findings of Fact:
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1.

That the Road has been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public because it has been
continuously used a public thoroughfare for a period often years, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §72-5-104 (and its predecessor statute Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89).

2.

That three factors must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order for a route
to be deemed a dedicated highway, abandoned to the use of the public under Utah Code Ann.
§ 72-5-104: "there must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period
often years. ...Once the technical provision of [the statute] have been satisfied, the road is
a 'public highway.' The court has no discretion to ignore that fact." Campbell v. Box Elder
County, 962 P.2d 806 at 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) citing Hebert City Corp. v. Simpson, 942
P.2d 307 at 310 (Utah 1997). That Plaintiffs successfully proved each of the foregoing
factors by clear and convincing evidence.

3.

That there is no requirement of proof of the owner's intent to offer the road to the public.
Bertagnole v. Pine Meadows Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 at 213 (Utah, 1981); see also Draper
City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 at 1099 (Utah, 1995) and Thurman v. Bvram, 626
P.2d 445 at 449 (Utah 1981).

4.

That continuous use is established where "the public has made a continuous and
uninterrupted use of the road as often as they found it convenient or necessary," Campbell,
962 P.2d at 809. The "use may be continuous though not constant...provided it occurred as
often as the claimant had occasion to choose to pass. Mere intermission is not interruption."
Id at 809 (citing Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977).
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5.

That Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14 provides a mechanism for private property owners to
restrict sportsman access to their property by posting:
''Properly posted" means that "No Trespassing" signs or a minimum of 100
square inches of bright yellow, bright orange, or flourescent paint are
displayed at all corners, fishing streams crossing property lines, roads, gates,
and rights-of-way entering the land. If metal fence posts are used, the entire
exterior side must be painted."
The plain and obvious intent of the statute is to require physical notation or warning at the
entrance or on the edge of property. Members of the public encountering such signs would
have to conclude, based upon the statute, that they were at a property line or on the edge of
private property, meaning that where they are standing is not restricted. Signs and painted
posts along a fence running parallel to a road, regardless of the physical juxtaposition of the
sign, more clearly indicate the fence as a boundary than prohibiting travel along the road
from which the signs can be seen. The signs and painted posts in this case clearly did what
the plaintiffs' witnesses assumed-they prohibited travel off of the road, not on the road.

6.

That the term "thoroughfare" is not defined in any Utah statute. Competent legal authority
defines the term as a "street or way opening at both ends into another street or public
highway, so that one can go through and get out of it without returning. It differs from a cul
de sac, which is open only at one end." Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Banks-Baldwin Law
Publishing Company, Cleveland: 1946. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that:
[w]hile it is difficult to fix a standard by which the measure what is a public
use or a public thoroughfare, it can be said here that the road was used by
many and different persons for a variety of purposes; that it was open to all
who desired to use it; that the use made of it was as general and extensive as
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the situation and surroundings would permit, had the road been formally laid
out as a pubic highway by public authority."
Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646 at 648 (Utah 1929).
The court has also stated that a '"thoroughfare' is a place or way through which there is
passing or travel. It becomes a 'public thoroughfare' when the public have a general right of
passage." Gilmore v. Carter, 15 U.2d 280, 291 P.2d 426 at 428 (Utah 1964).
In another case evidence that the road was generally impassable, that the road failed to
connect or lead to public property and that there had been only minimal maintenance were
reasons to overturn a determination by summary judgment that a proposed road was a
highway. Draper Citv v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 at 1100-1101 (Utah 1995). Of
course the Draper City case did not determine that the road known as the "Lower Canyon
Corner Road" could not be determined to be a public highway in the face of such evidence,
only that the issue could not be resolved via summary judgment. This case is in a
substantially different posture.
That the Road was a public thoroughfare before 1980.
That having determined that the Road was dedicated and abandoned to the public before
1980 by clear and convincing evidence, this Court must also determine the reasonable and
necessary width of the Road. See Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 and 914 (Utah Ct. App.
1996), Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3).
That the reasonable and necessary width of the Road to ensure safe travel is 26 feet,
including a 20 foot wide travel width and three (3) foot shoulders on each side.
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10.

That Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 provides that any person who installs, places or maintains
a structure within the right-of-way of a highway must remove the structure within ten days
upon notice. Upon failure to remove the structure "[a] highway authority may recover . ..
. (b) $10 for each day the installation remained within the right-of-way after notice was
complete."

11.

Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable costs of court as the prevailing party to be established by
affidavit.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ordered,

adjudged, and decreed as follows:
1.

That the Road from the gate at the Butler residence to the Uinta National Forest Boundary
is hereby declared a public highway within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104 (and
its predecessor statute Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89).

2.

That the location of Road is where it presently exists.

3.

That the scope (or width) of the right-of-way of the Road west of the gate at the Butler
Residence is 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder on each side and a 20 foot travel width, the
centerline of which is the center of the exiting Bennie Creek Road.

4.

That the Defendants and their successors and assigns shall not take any action that blocks,
locks, or otherwise interferes with public access to the Road.

5.

That the Defendants immediately remove any and all structures, blockages, gates, fences or
anything that blocks, locks, or otherwise interferes with public access across the Road.
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That Plaintiff Utah County's request for judgment, joint and several, against Defendants
Randy Butler and Donna Butler at the rate of $10 per day from July 29,1997 to the date of
the order, plus interest at the legal rate from the date of judgment is hereby denied.

7,

That Plaintiffs are.awarded judgment, joint and several, against Defendants Randy Butler and
Donna Butlp^Blaine and Linda Evans for reasonable costs of courtdetermined by a verified

r^//
\

S£^
$•

bill of Qbsts pursuant to URCP Rule 54 in the amount of $
and $

for Utah County

for the State of Utah.

Plaintiff Utah County is ordered to record this Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order in the records of the Utah County Recorder.

9.

For interest on the Judgement at the legal rate from date of the entry of judgment.
DATED this /(p day of 7T-**V

Notice of objections must be submitted to the Court anarSiafflae^Pwithin five (5) days after
service, pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER, postage prepaid, this//^day of/

IMJJ^

. 2004,

to the following:
MARK E. ARNOLD
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C.
57 West 200 South #105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
MARTIN B. BUSHMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office
1594 West North Temple, Suite 2110
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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Mark L. Shurtleff and Martin B. Bushman, Salt Lake
City, and M. Cort Griffin and Robert J. Moore, Provo,
for Appellees

Before Judges Bench, McHugh, and Thorne.
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Kl
Defendants Randy Butler, Donna Butler, Blaine Evans, and
Linda Evans appeal the trial court's conclusion that Bennie Creek
Road (the Road) is a public highway under Utah Code section 72-5104(1) (the Dedication Statute). See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5104(1) (2001). Utah County cross-appeals the trial court's
decision to deny statutory damages caused by Defendants' refusal
to remove a gate after receiving service of notice. We affirm in
part and remand for a determination of statutory damages owed to
Utah County.

BACKGROUND
f2
The Road runs west from U.S. Highway 89 into the Uinta
National Forest (the National Forest), providing access to
camping areas, hiking trails, and the Nebo Loop. Portions of the
Road cross Defendants1 properties before reaching the National
Forest. In 1996, Defendants prevented public access to the Road
by erecting a metal gate. On July 29, 1997, the Utah County
Board of Commissioners served Defendants with notice ordering the
removal of the gate from the Road. Because Defendants refused to
remove the gate, Utah County and the State of Utah Department of
Natural Resources (Plaintiffs) brought this action to have the
Road declared a public highway and to force the removal of the
metal gate.
%3
Following an eight-day bench trial in June 2004, the court
concluded that the Road had been dedicated to public use long ago
and ordered the gate removed. At trial, the court heard
testimony from previous and current landowners, various users of
the Road, National Forest workers, and public employees assigned
to maintain the Road. The testimony conflicted as to the prior
use of gates, placement of no-trespassing signs, and ownership
reactions to public use of the road. After evaluating the
credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence, the trial
court ultimately determined that the Road had been open to public
use from the mid-1920s until about 1980.
1|4
The trial court issued a memorandum decision directing
Plaintiffs to prepare a final order containing factual findings
and conclusions of law consistent with those outlined in the
memorandum. Defendants objected to the proposed findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and order submitted by Plaintiffs, and
requested a hearing. The trial court signed the proposed order
without holding a hearing. Defendants now appeal.
1[5
Despite concluding that the Road had been dedicated to
public use and that Defendants did not remove the gate after
receiving proper notice, the trial court refused to award Utah
County its demand for statutory damages. In refusing to make the
award, the trial court ruled that conflicting evidence in the
record as to whether the gate was locked prevented the court from
being able to accurately calculate damages. Utah County crossappeals the refusal to award statutory damages.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
%6
Defendants argue that the trial court erred by determining
that the Road was dedicated to public use under Utah Code section
72-5-104(1). See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001). " [W]hen
reviewing a trial court's decision regarding whether a public
highway has been established . . . , we review the decision for
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correctness but grant the court significant discretion in its
application of the facts to the statute." Heber City Corp. v.
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 1997).
f7
Defendants also assert that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to rule on their objections to the proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. In challenging
a discretionary decision of the trial court, Defendants must
demonstrate that the court exceeded the measure of discretion the
law affords it. This is done by showing that there is "no
reasonable basis for the [court's] decision." Crookston v. Fire
Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).
%8
In its cross-appeal, Utah County claims that in light of
Defendants' refusal to remove the gate after receiving proper
notice in 1997, Utah County is entitled to an award for statutory
damages. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 (2001). We review a
trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, granting no
deference to the trial court. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,
936 (Utah 1994).
ANALYSIS
I. PUBLIC ROAD
f9
For a road to be dedicated to public use, it must be
"continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten
years." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104; see also Simpson, 942 P.2d at
310. Defendants claim that (a) the use relied upon by the trial
court was not public use, and that (b) the use was not continuous
(c) for a period of ten years.
a. Public Use
If 10 Defendants argue that because most of Plaintiffs' witnesses
used the Road as trespassers, the witnesses should not be
considered members of the public for purposes of determining that
the Road was dedicated to public use. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5104(1). Defendants, however, provide no legal support for their
argument, nor a compelling reason why trespassers cannot be
considered members of the public.
1|ll In fact, "under Utah law . . . permissive use cannot result
in either adverse possession or dedication of private property to
the public." Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809
(Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also State v. Six Mile Ranch Co., 2006
UT App 104,1(19, 132 P. 3d 687 (holding that permissive use may not
be considered in a public dedication determination). Under the
Dedication Statute, public use cannot include permissive use, nor
can it include use by "owners of adjoining property." Draper
City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995).
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Defendants' proposed interpretation would render the Dedication
Statute ineffective because no use could ever constitute public
use. To give the Dedication Statute proper effect, we hold that
non-permissive use must be considered public use. We therefore
agree with the trial court that trespassers are members of the
"public" for purposes of determining whether the Dedication
Statute has been satisfied. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1)
(2001).
b. Continuous Use
fl2 Defendants claim that, even if the trial court properly
defined public use, the trial court erred in concluding that the
Road was used continuously because there were gates along the
road and seasonal weather conditions made the Road impassable at
times.
fl3 While there was conflicting testimony at trial regarding the
status and purpose of these gates, we are not in a position to
closely scrutinize the factual findings of the trial court in
public thoroughfare dedication cases. See Heber City Corp. v.
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309-10 (Utah 1997) (holding that factual
issues in public dedication cases do not lend themselves to close
review). Therefore, unless the findings of fact are clearly
unsupported by the record, we will seek only to apply the trial
court's factual findings to the law of abandonment and public
dedication.
1J14 This court has interpreted the Dedication Statute as
requiring "continuous and uninterrupted use of a road over ten
years where 'the public, even though not consisting of a great
many persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use . . . as
often as they found it convenient or necessary.1" Campbell, 962
P.2d at 809 (emphasis added) (omission in original) (citation
omitted). "[U]se may be continuous though not constant. . . .
[Pjrovided it occurred as often as the claimant had occasion or
chose to pass. Mere intermission is not interruption." Id.
(omission in original) (emphasis added) (quotations and citation
omitted).
1|15 Even though it appears that there were instances when
seasonal weather rendered the Road temporarily impassible, the
trial court found that the Road was used by the public whenever
it was convenient or necessary. Additionally, the court held
that the gates in question were generally unlocked from about
1925 until 1980 and were used merely to restrict the travel of
livestock, not people. These times of impasse amount to "mere
intermission[s]" of public use. Id. We therefore agree with the
trial court's conclusion that the Road was in continuous use by
the public for an extended period of time.

20040809-CA

4

c. Period of Ten Years
1(16 Defendants argue that the trial court erred because it
failed to identify an exact ten-year period during which the Road
was continuously used. Language in the Dedication Statute
requires a finding of continuous use for at least ten years, and
therefore permits a finding of public dedication based on a time
period greater than ten years. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1)
(2 001). The trial court determined that the Road was
continuously used by the public from about 1925 until 1980, or
approximately fifty-five years. This fifty-five year span of
public use clearly exceeds the statutory minimum requirement of
ten years.
%11 Defendants1 arguments on this issue imply a challenge to the
trial court's factual findings that the Road was continuously
open to the public for a sufficient period of time. By failing
to offer case law supporting their position and merely pointing
to conflicting evidence in the record concerning the time period
issue, Defendants simply invite this court to meddle with the
trial court's findings of fact. Again, we will not closely
scrutinize the factual findings of a trial court when reviewing
public dedication cases; we seek only to ensure that the trial
court has properly applied those facts to the law. See Simpson,
942 P.2d at 309-10. Therefore, we agree with the trial court
that Plaintiffs properly demonstrated that the Road was
continuously used by the public for at least ten years. See Utah
Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1).
II. OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED ORDER
^[18 After the trial court's decision, Defendants filed
objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and order, with a request for a hearing, arguing insufficiency of
the evidence. Despite Defendants' objections, the trial court
entered the proposed findings and order without another hearing.
Defendants argue that in ruling on their objections without
holding a hearing, the trial court abused its discretion. We
disagree.
fl9 The trial court is afforded great latitude in determining
whether a hearing will be held on non-dispositive motions. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e). Under rule 7(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the trial court "may hold a hearing on any motion" but
is not required to do so. Id. The proposed order eventually
adopted by the trial court was sufficiently similar to the
memorandum decision to provide a reasonable basis on which the
trial court could decide to deny a hearing on the objections.
Because Defendant's motion was simply an objection to the factual
findings of the trial court, the court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to hold a hearing on Defendants'
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objection. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938
(Utah 1993).
III. DAMAGES
1J20 In its cross-appeal, Utah County challenges the trial
court's ruling that it is not entitled to statutory damages for
the time the metal gate remained across the Road after Utah
County served Defendants notice. Utah County argues that
Defendants' failure to remove the gate after receiving proper
service of notice automatically results in the statutory penalty.
Under section 72-7-104, when an installation is not removed
within ten days after service of notice is completed, "[a]
highway authority may recover: (a) the costs and expenses
incurred in removing the installation, serving notice, and the
costs of a lawsuit if any; and (b) [ten dollars] for each day the
installation remain[s] within the right-of-way after notice was
complete." Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4) (2001). More than nine
years have passed since Defendants received service of notice,
and the gate has apparently not been removed.
1J21 Utah County argues that it met its burden to show that
service was completed and that the gate remained in place
throughout this litigation. Utah County claims that the trial
court did not have discretion to deny statutory damages. We
agree. Pursuant to section 72-7-104(5), when the highway
authority is granted a judgment after the removal of an
installation is contested, it is entitled to the remedies
referred to above. See id. § 72-7-104(5). It is clear from the
record that Defendants did not remove the gate subsequent to
receiving notice from Utah County. The record reflects that the
trial court was reticent to award Utah County these costly
damages. In declining to award damages, the trial court pointed
to conflicting testimony regarding whether the gate was locked,
despite finding that the Road was indeed a public highway, that
notice to remove the gate was properly served, and that the gate
was not removed.
1[22 We conclude that the installation of the gate clearly falls
under the proscribed structures "of any kind or character"
regardless of whether it was locked. Id. § 72-7-104(1). The
record shows that the trial court gave much consideration to
whether the gate remained locked after Defendants received
notice. Such a factual determination is inapplicable to section
72-7-104(4), which concerns itself only with installations across
public highways, not whether the installations are locked. See
id. § 72-7-104(4). Because Utah County made a proper showing
that the gate remained in place after notice was completed, the
trial court should have awarded section 72-7-104(4) damages.
1]23 We recognize that this decision will, in effect, award Utah
County substantial statutory damages despite its failure to take
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advantage of the self-help remedies available to it under section
72-7-104(1). See id. § 72-7-104(1). We also recognize that this
decision will force landowners to think twice about deciding
whether to remove similar installations after receiving notice
from a highway authority--even when the landowner intends to
challenge the highway authority's decisions in court. The ten
dollar per day penalty begins to accrue ten days after notice is
completed, and continues to accrue until the installation is
removed. The statute simply does not provide for a tolling of
the penalty during a legal dispute between a landowner and a
highway authority, nor does it limit the total amount a highway
authority may recover. We are therefore constrained to reward
the highway authority's decision to not remove the installation
and conclude that damages should be calculated from ten days
after completion of service of notice until such time as the gate
is removed. Surely the legislature did not anticipate such a
long gap between the completion of service of notice and removal
of the installation. But the plain language of the statute
prevents us from interpreting the provision for statutory damages
otherwise. See id. § 72-7-104 (1)-(5) .
CONCLUSION
K24 The trial court properly applied its factual conclusions to
the law of abandonment and public dedication of a highway in
finding that the Road is a public highway. The challenges by
Defendants are largely an attack on the trial court's factual
findings, which in public dedication cases, we will not closely
scrutinize. However, the trial court erred by failing to award
statutory damages after concluding that the gate remained across
the Road well after Utah County completed service of notice. We
therefore affirm the trial court's conclusion that the Road is a
public highway under Utah Code section 72-5-104(1), and remand
the case for a calculation of statutory damages consistent with
this opinion and Utah Code section 72-7-104.

Ku^fl/J.J^^L

Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge

H25

WE CONCUR:

6Jrt<*
Carolyn^. McHugh, Judge

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
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Utah County and State of Utah,
by and through its Department
of Natural Resources and
Division of Wildlife Resources,
Respondents,
Case No. 20070009-SC
20040809-CA

v.
Randy Butler, Donna Butler,
Margaret Condley, Elizabeth
Condley, Blaine Evans, Linda
Evans, and John Does 1-15,
Petitioners.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
certiorari, filed on January 3, 2007.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issues:
1. Whether trespassing may constitute a public use pursuant
to the Dedication Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104.
2. Whether the district court erred in its determination
that the public had continuously used the road at issue in this
case according to the requirements of the Dedication Statute.
3. Whether the district court failed to designate a
specific ten-year period of continuous use and, if so, whether
that failure constituted reversible error.
4. Whether the court of appeals erred in its application of
Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4) to the facts of this case.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to

submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.

For The Court:

Dated

i^jMf-

Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on March 16, 2007, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or
placed in the Interdepartmental mail service, or hand delivered
to the parties listed below:
MARTIN B. BUSHMAN
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
1594 W N TEMPLE STE 300
PO BOX 140855
SALT LAKE'CITY UT 84114-0855
SCOTT L. WIGGINS
ARNOLD & WIGGINS PC
AMERICAN PLAZA II STE 105
57 W 200 S
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
M. CORT GRIFFIN
ROBERT J. MOORE
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY OFFICE
100 E CENTER ST #2400
PROVO UT 8 4 606
LISA COLLINS
COURT OF APPEALS
4 50 S STATE ST
PO BOX 140230
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230
FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT
ATTN: AMBER / JENNI / CALLI
125 N 100 W
PROVO UT 84 603
Dated this March 16, 2007.

Deputy Clerk

/

Case No. 20070009
Court of Appeals Case No. 20040809
FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT Case No. 000403372
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PROTECTION OF HIGHWAYS

72-7-104

(1) the highway authority acquires right of ingress and egress by gift,
agreement, purchase, eminent domain, or otherwise: or
(2) no right of ingress or egress exists between the right-of-way and the
adjoining property.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 134; C. 1953,
27-12-134; renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 270,
§ 173.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as §

27-12-134; deleted the former first paragraph,
which provided that highway authorities are
authorized to adopt regulations and require
permits and surety bonds for structures or
objects on public highway rights-of-way; and
made stylistic changes throughout the section.

72-7-104. Installations constructed in violation of rules —
Rights of highway authorities to remove or require removal.
(1) If any person, firm, or corporation installs, places, constructs, alters,
repairs, or maintains any approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit,
sewer, ditch, culvert, outdoor advertising sign, or any other structure or object
6f any kind or character within the right-of-way of any highway without
complying with this title, the highway authority having jurisdiction over the
right-of-way may:
(a) remove the installation from the right-of-way or require the person,
firm, or corporation to remove the installation; or
(b) give written notice to the person, firm, or corporation to remove the
installation from the right-of-way.
(2) Notice under Subsection (l)(b) may be served by:
(a) personal service; or
(b) (i) mailing the notice to the person, firm, or corporation by certified
mail; and
(ii) posting a copy on the installation for ten days.
(3) If the installation is not removed within ten days after the notice is
complete, the highway authority may remove the installation at the expense of
the person, firm, or corporation.
(4) A highway authority may recover:
(a) the costs and expenses incurred in removing the installation,
serving notice, and the costs of a lawsuit if any; and
(b) $10 for each day the installation remained within the right-of-way
after notice was complete.
(5) (a) If the person, firm, or corporation disputes or denies the existence,
placement, construction, or maintenance of the installation, or refuses to
remove or permit its removal, the highway authority may bring an action
to abate the installation as a public nuisance.
(b) If the highway authority is granted a judgment, the highway
authority may recover the costs of having the public nuisance abated as
provided in Subsection (4).
(6) The department, its agents, or employees, if acting in good faith, incur no
liability for causing removal of an installation within a right-of-way of a
highway as provided in this section.
(7) The actions of the department under this section are not subject to the
Provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act.
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History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 135; 1990, ch.
300, § 1; C. 1953, 27-12-135; renumbered by
L. 1998, ch. 270, § 174.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered

this section, which formerly appeared as S
27-12-135; in Subsection (1) substituted "this
title" for "this chapter"; and made stylistic
changes,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Determination of nature of road.
Nature of remedies.
Removal.
Determination of n a t u r e of road.
Whether county officers were immune from
suit for trespass after they had removed a
locked gate from a roadway depended upon the
public or private nature of the road as determined by the trial court and not the commissioners. Blonquist v. Summit County, 25 Utah
2d 387, 483 R2d 430 (1971).

Nature of r e m e d i e s .
None of the remedies of this statute is exclusive, nor are the remedies restrictive of the
common-law right to summarily remove obstructions from a highway. Blonquist v. Summit
County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 483 R2d 430 (1971).
Removal.
If a road is public, notice that a gate will be
removed does not make summary removal unlawful. Blonquist v. Summit Countv, 25 Utah
2d 387, 483 P.2d 430 (1971).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways,
Streets, and Bridges § 362 et seq.

C.J.S. — 40 C.J.S. Highways § 223 et seq.

72-7-105. Obstructing traffic on sidewalks or highways
prohibited.
(1) A person may not:
(a) drive or place any vehicle, animal, or other thing upon or along any
sidewalk except in crossing the sidewalk to or from abutting property; or
(b) permit the vehicle, animal, or other thing to remain on or across any
sidewalk in a way that impedes or obstructs the ordinary use of the
sidewalk.
(2) (a) Except under Subsection (2)(b), vehicles, building material, or other
similar things may be placed temporarily on highways in a manner that
will not impede, endanger, or obstruct ordinary traffic.
(b) A highway authority may prohibit or may require the removal of
vehicles, building material, or other obstructions on any highway under
their jurisdiction.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 138; 1991, ch.
137, § 62; C. 1953, 27-12-138; renumbered
by L. 1998, c h . 270, § 175.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as §
27-12-138; divided Subsections (1) and (2), adding the (a) and (b) designations; in Subsection
(1), m the introductory \anguage,
substituted
"A person may not" for "It is unlawful to"; in

Subsection (2)(a) added "Except under Subsection (2)(b)" after "Vehicles"; in Subsection (2Kb)
added "A highway authority may prohibit or
may require removal of" and substituted uon
any highway under their jurisdiction" for "are
permitted to remain on any highway contrary
to instructions from the highway authority
having jurisdiction over the highway"; and
made styiistic and punctuation changes.

638

TabF

